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Kotaro Suzumura’s work are mostly in the area of welfare economics and social choice
theory. His work in the area of theoretical industrial organization, as well as his policy-
oriented work on industrial policy, competition policy, and development policy, are deriva-
tives from his work on welfare economics and social choice theory. This collection of his
selected papers gathers his representative contributions in the major area of research,
which are classiﬁed in seven parts.
The ﬁrst part focuses on the axiomatic characterization of the concept of rational
choice as purposive action. It was Lionel Robbins who ﬁrst crystallized this classical
notion of rationality, which Paul Samuelson elaborated into the celebrated ediﬁce of
revealed preference theory. Capitalizing on the contributions by Paul Samuelson, Hen-
drik Houthakker, Kenneth Arrow, Marcel Richter, Bengt Hansson, and Amartya Sen,
Suzumura contributed to the axiomatic characterization of rational choice on the gen-
eral domain. As an auxiliary step, Suzumura generalized Szpilrajn’s classical extension
theorem on binary relations in terms of his newly introduced concept of consistency. Con-
sistency of a binary relation requires any preference cycle to involve indiﬀerence only. As
shown by Suzumura, consistency is necessary and suﬃcient for the existence of an order-
ing extension of a binary relation. This novel concept of consistency and the generalized
extension theorem are playing a basic role in this and many other contexts of choice and
preference. This part contains Suzumura’s basic contributions along these lines.
The second part focuses on the logical conﬂict between equity and eﬃciency in several
distinct contexts. Generalizing the early contributions by Serge Kolm, Duncan Foley, and
Hal Varian, which may be traced back even further to John Hicks and Jan Tinbergen,
Suzumura contributed to build a bridge between the theory of fairness and the theory
of social choice, thereby enriching both theories and clarifying their logical relationships.
This assertion is substantiated by the ﬁrst two papers in this part. There is another and
even more classical concept of equity, which was introduced by Henry Sidgwick in the
context of treating diﬀerent generations equitably. The last two papers in this part are
Suzumura’s recent work on the possibility of ordering inﬁnite utility streams on the basis
of intergenerational equity and intertemporal eﬃciency.
The third part focuses on the Arrovian impossibility theorems in social choice theory.
Arrow’s original formulation of the problem of social choice was in terms of the social
welfare function, the maximization of which subject to the feasibility constraints was
construed to be the task of the social decision-maker. An early work of Suzumura inthis arena was to see how Arrow’s impossibility theorem fares if we get rid of the social
welfare function and focus directly on the social choice per se. One of his more recent
work in this arena asked how the Arrovian impossibility theorem fares if we treat an
explicitly economic environment and weaken Arrow’s axiom of independence of irrelevant
alternatives by allowing richer information about individual preferences. This part also
contains a paper in which the crucial concept of coherence was ﬁrst introduced, and
another paper on the logical relations between the compensation principles ` al aK a l d o r ,
Hicks, Scitovsky and Samuelson, on the one hand, and the Bergson-Samuelson social
welfare function, on the other.
The fourth part focuses on the logical coherence between social welfare and individual
rights. It was Amartya Sen who posed the problem of compatibility of these two essential
values in social choice, which he crystallized into the justly famous impossibility of a
Paretian liberal. Suzumura’s contribution in this arena is two-hold. In the ﬁrst place,
he could identify several escape routes from Sen’s impasse, keeping Sen’s formulation
of individual rights in terms of individual decisiveness in social choice intact. In the
second place, he came to the important recognition that Sen’s original articulation of
libertarian rights is incompatible with the classical concept of freedom of choice ` al a
John Stuart Mill, and contributed to develop an alternative game-form articulation of
individual rights. This part contains some of his representative contributions along these
lines.
The ﬁfth part focuses on the welfare eﬀect of increasing competitiveness and interﬁrm
collaboration. Contrary to the widespread and classical belief in competition as an eﬃ-
cient and decentralized mechanism for allocating resources, Suzumura proved what came
to be called the excess entry theorem to the eﬀect that the free-entry number of ﬁrms in
the Cournot oligopoly market is socially excessive vis-` a-vis the ﬁrst-best number of ﬁrms
as well as the second-best number of ﬁrms. This and related work motivated him to dig
much deeper into the relationship between welfare, competition and collaboration. This
part contains his major contributions in this area of research.
The sixth part focuses on the intrinsic, rather than instrumental, value of opportu-
nities for making choice and procedures for decision-making. The inquiry along this line
led Suzumura to go beyond consequentialism, which had remained almost unchallenged
in the literature. He could obtain an axiomatic characterization of consequentialism and
non-consequentialism, as well as some clariﬁcations of the eﬀects of going beyond con-
sequentialism on such standard result as Arrow’s general impossibility theorem in the
theory of social choice.The seventh part focuses on the analytical history of welfare economics. Although
the nomenclature of welfare economics should be attributed to Arthur Pigou for his
celebrated classic, The Economics of Welfare, the history of welfare economics could be
traced back at least as far as to Adam Smith and Jeremy Bentham, and possibly further
beyond Adam Smith, under the classical nomenclature of moral philosophy. Suzumura’s
work in this arena crystallize some of the crucial steps in the historical evolution of welfare
economics, paying due attention to the informational basis of social welfare judgements,
and the intrinsic value of social decision-making procedures and opportunities to choose.
This part also contains two interviews with the great pioneers in the development of
welfare economics and social choice theory, viz., Paul Samuelson and Kenneth Arrow.Chapter 1
Rational Choice and Revealed Preference¤
1 Introduction
According to the currently dominant view, the choice behaviour of an agent is construed
to be rational if there exists a preference relation R such that, for every set S of available
states, the choice therefrom is the set of “R-optimal” points in S.1 There are at least two
alternative deﬁnitions of R-optimality—R-maximality and R-greatestness. On the one
hand, an x in S is said to be R-maximal in S if there exists no y in S which is strictly
preferred to x in terms of R. On the other, an x in S is said to be R-greatest in S if, for
all y in S, x is at least as preferable as y in terms of R. The former viewpoint can claim
its relevance in view of the prevalent adoption of the concept of Pareto-eﬃciency in the
theory of resource allocation processes.2 The latter standpoint is deeply rooted in the
well-developed theories of the integrability problem, revealed preference and social choice.
The diﬀerence between these two deﬁnitions of rational choice is basically as follows. Any
two states in a choice function which is R-maximal rational are either R-indiﬀerent or
R-incomparable, while any two states in a choice function which is R-greatest rational
are R-indiﬀerent.
A condition for rational choice has been put forward in terms of the R-greatestness
interpretation of optimality (Hansson [4] and Richter [9, 10]). In this chapter, a condition
for rational choice in its R-maximality interpretation will be presented. The condition
in question will, in a certain sense, synthesize both concepts of rationality, because it
can be seen that the rational choice in terms of R-maximality is rational in terms of
R-greatestness as well. The role of various axioms of revealed preference and congruence
in the theory of rational choice will also be clariﬁed.
¤First published in Review of Economic Studies, Vol.43, 1976, pp.149-158. Thanks are due to the
editors of this journal for their helpful comments on the earlier version of this chapter.
1Arrow’s seminal works [1, 2] are the main sources of the current theory of rational choice. Notable
contributions in this ﬁeld include Hansson [4], Richter [9, 10] and Sen [13], among others. See also
Herzberger [5], Jamison and Lau [7] and Wilson [16]. In his recent paper [8], Plott axiomatized the
concept of path-independent choice which is related to, but distinct from, the concept of rational choice.
See Suzumura [15].
2See also Herzberger [5, pp.196-199], who calls an agent a liberal maximizer [resp. stringent maxi-
mizer], if he chooses R-maximal points [resp. R-greatest points] from the points available and favours
the liberal maximizer as a model of rational agent.
1In this kind of analysis, special care should be taken with the domain of the choice
function. It was Arrow [1] who ﬁrst suggested that “the demand-function point of view
would be greatly simpliﬁed if the range over which the choice functions are considered to
be determined is broadened to include all ﬁnite sets”. This line of enquiry was recently
completed by Sen [13].3 It is true, as was persuasively discussed by Sen [13, Section 6],
that there is no convincing reason for our restricting the domain of the choice function
to the class of convex polyhedras representing budget sets in the commodity space. At
the same time, however, it should be admitted that there exists no speciﬁc reason for our
extending the domain so as to include all ﬁnite sets. This being the case, no restriction
whatsoever will be placed on the domain of the choice function in this chapter except
that it should be a non-empty family of non-empty sets.
In Section 2, our conceptual framework will be presented. The main results will be
stated in Section 3, the proofs thereof being given in Section 4. In Section 5 we will
present some examples which will negate the converse of our theorems. Finally, Section
6 will be devoted to comparing our results with the Arrow-Sen theory, on the one hand,
and the Richter-Hansson theory, on the other.
2 Deﬁnitions
Let X be the basic set of all alternatives and let K stand for the non-empty family of
non-empty subsets of X. A suggested interpretation is that each and every S 2 K is the
set of available alternatives which could possibly be presented to the agent. For the sake
of brevity, a series of formal deﬁnitions will be given below.
Deﬁnition 1 (Preference Relation): A preference relation is a binary relation R on X,
that is to say, a subset of X £ X. If (x;y) 2 R, we say that x is at least as preferable as
y. A strict preference relation associated with R is a binary relation
PR = f(x;y) 2 X £ Xj(x;y) 2 R & (y;x) = 2 Rg:
An indiﬀerence relation associated with R is a binary relation
IR = f(x;y) 2 X £ Xj(x;y) 2 R & (y;x) 2 Rg:
R is said to be
(a) complete iﬀ f(x;y);(y;x)g \ R 6= ; for all x;y 2 X,
(b) acyclic iﬀ (x;x) = 2 T(PR) for all x 2 X;4
(c) transitive iﬀ [(x;y) 2 R & (y;z) 2 R ) (x;z) 2 R] for all x;y;z 2 X, and
3As was carefully noted by Sen [13, p.312], the Arrow-Sen theory works well even if the domain
includes all pairs and all triples, but not all ﬁnite sets.
4For any binary relation Q on X, T(Q) stands for the transitive closure of Q: T(Q) = f(x;y) 2
X £Xj(x;y) 2 Q or [(x;z1);(zk;zk+1);(zn;y) 2 Q (k = 1;:::;n¡1) for some fz1;:::;zng ½ X]g. If R
is acyclic, there exists no strict preference cycle.
2(d) an ordering iﬀ it is complete as well as transitive.
Deﬁnition 2 (Maximal-Point Set and Greatest-Point Set): Let R and S be, respec-
tively, a preference relation and an arbitrary subset of X. The subsets M(S;R) and
G(S;R) of S, to be called the R-maximal-point set and the R-greatest-point set of S,
respectively, are deﬁned by
M(S;R) = fx 2 Xjx 2 S & (y;x) = 2 PR for all y 2 Sg
and
G(S;R) = fx 2 Xjx 2 S & (x;y) 2 R for all y 2 Sg:
Remark 1. (i) For any S ½ X and R ½ X £ X;G(S;R) ½ M(S;R), and (ii) if R is
complete, G(S;R) = M(S;R).5 For any x;y 2 G(S;R), we have (x;y) 2 IR, while for
any x;y 2 M(S;R), we have either (x;y) 2 IR or [(x;y) = 2 R & (y;x) = 2 R].
Deﬁnition 3 (Choice Function): A choice function is a function C on K such that
C(S) is a non-empty subset of S for all S 2 K.
The intended interpretation is that, for any set S of available alternatives, the subset
C(S) thereof represents the set of alternatives which are chosen from S. Associated with
the given choice function C on K, we can deﬁne various concepts of revealed preference.
Deﬁnition 4 (Revealed Preference Relations): Two preference relations R¤ and R¤ on
X such that
(a)(x;y) 2 R¤ iﬀ [x 2 C(S) & y 2 S] for some S 2 K, and
(b)(x;y) 2 R¤ iﬀ [x = 2 S or x 2 C(S) or y = 2 C(S)] for all S 2 K
are called the revealed preference relations.
In words, x is said to be revealed R¤-preferred to y if x is chosen when y is also avail-
able, and x is said to be revealed R¤-preferred to y if there exists no choice situation in
which y is chosen and x is available but rejected. In order to connect these revealed pref-
erence relations to the revealed preference axioms, we introduce the following auxiliary
concept.
Deﬁnition 5 (C-connectedness): A sequence of sets (S1;:::;Sn) in K is said to be
C-connected iﬀ Sk \ C(Sk+1) 6= ; for all k 2 f1;::: n ¡ 1g and Sn \ C(S1) 6= ;.
It turns out that for our present purpose the following rather abstract formulation of
the revealed preference axioms is the most convenient.
Deﬁnition 6 (Revealed Preference Axioms): A choice function C on K is said to
satisfy
5For the proof of this well-known result, see Herzberger [5, Proposition P1] and Sen [12, Chapter 1¤].
3(a)Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference — (WARP), for short — iﬀ for any C-
connected pair (S1;S2) in K, S1 \ C(S2) = C(S1) \ S2 holds,
(b)Strong Axiom of Revealed Preference — (SARP), for short — iﬀ for any C-
connected sequence (S1;:::;Sn) in K, Sk \ C(Sk+1) = C(Sk) \ Sk+1 for some
k 2 f1;:::;n ¡ 1g holds, and
(c)Hansson’s Axiom of Revealed Preference — (HARP), for short — iﬀ for any
C-connected sequence (S1;:::;Sn) in K, Sk \ C(Sk+1) = C(Sk) \ Sk+1 for all
k 2 f1;:::;n ¡ 1g.
At ﬁrst sight, (WARP) and (SARP) in Deﬁnition 6, which are due originally to
Hansson [4], might seem rather diﬀerent from their traditional formulation, such as in
Sen [13], but they are equivalent. In order to substantiate this claim, let us deﬁne another
revealed preference relation R¤¤ by (x;y) 2 R¤¤ iﬀ [x 2 C(S) & y 2 SnC(S)] for some
S 2 K. By deﬁnition, we have R¤¤ ½ R¤. (In words, x is said to be revealed R¤¤-preferred
to y if x is chosen and y is available but rejected.) In terms of R¤ and R¤¤, the common
version of (WARP) is given by:
(x;y) 2 R
¤¤ ) (y;x) = 2 R
¤: (1)
Similarly, the traditional formulation of (SARP) is given by:
(x;y) 2 T(R
¤¤) ) (y;x) = 2 R
¤: (2)
It will be shown in the Appendix that (1) and (2) are equivalent to (WARP) and (SARP),
respectively, in Deﬁnition 6.
We are now in the position to introduce the concepts coined by Richter [9] and Sen
[13].
Deﬁnition 7 (Congruence Axioms): A choice function C on K is said to satisfy
(a)Weak Congruence Axiom — (WCA), for short — iﬀ for any S 2 K;(x;y) 2 R¤;
x 2 S and y 2 C(S) imply x 2 C(S), and
(b)Strong Congruence Axiom — (SCA), for short — iﬀ for any S 2 K;(x;y) 2 T(R¤);
x 2 S and y 2 C(S) imply x 2 C(S).
The central concepts of this paper are given by the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 8 (Rational Choice Function): A choice function C on K is said to be
(a)G-rational iﬀ there exists a preference relation R such that C(S) = G(S;R) for
all S 2 K, and
(b)M-rational iﬀ there exists a preference relation R such that C(S) = M(S;R) for
all S 2 K.
4A preference relation R which rationalizes the choice function C is called the ratio-
nalization of C.6
Intuitively, a choice function is said to be rational if we can interpret the stipulated
choice behaviour as a kind of preference optimization. Two possible interpretations of
this idea are formulated in Deﬁnition 8(a) and (b). It should be noted that the M-rational
choice function is G-rational but not vice versa. This can be seen as follows. Let C on
K be M-rational with the rationalization R. We deﬁne a binary relation R0 on X by
[(x;y) 2 R0 , (y;x) = 2 PR] for all x and y in X. From Deﬁnition 2, we then have
M(S;R) = G(S;R0) for all S 2 K, so that C is G-rational with the rationalization R0.
In order to see that the G-rational choice function is not necessarily M-rational, let us
consider an example where X = fx;y;zg;K = fS1;S2;S3g;S1 = fx;yg;S2 = fx;zg;S3 =
X;C(S1) = S1;C(S2) = S2 and C(S3) = fxg. This choice function is G-rational with the
rationalization R = f(x;y);(y;x);(x;z);(z;x)g. Assume that this C is M-rational with
the rationalization R0. From C(S1) = S1 we obtain:
(x;y) 2 IR0 or [(x;y) = 2 R
0 & (y;x) = 2 R
0] (3)
From C(S2) = S2 we obtain:
(x;z) 2 IR0 or [(x;z) = 2 R
0 & (z;x) = 2 R
0] (4)
From C(S3) = fxg we obtain:
[(x;y) 2 PR0 or (z;y) = 2 PR0] & [(x;z) 2 PR0 or (y;z) 2 PR0]: (5)
From (3), (4) and (5) we obtain (z;y);(y;z) 2 PR0, which contradicts Deﬁnition 1. Thus
the choice function in question is not M-rational.
In view of Deﬁnition 2 and the associated remark, it is clear that both concepts of
rationality coincide if the rationalization is complete. If this complete rationalization
satisﬁes the transitivity axiom as well, we say, following Richter [10], that the choice
function is regular-rational.
Finally, let us introduce the concept of normality.
Deﬁnition 9 (Normal Choice Function): Let two functions G¤ and M¤ on K be deﬁned
by G¤(S) = G(S;R¤) and M¤(S) = M(S;R¤) for all S 2 K. A choice function C on K
is said to be
(a) G-normal iﬀ C(S) = G¤(S) for all S 2 K, and
(b) M-normal iﬀ C(S) = M¤(S) for all S 2 K.
6It should be noted that (i) there exists an irrational choice and (ii) the rationalization of the rational
choice function is not necessarily unique. The following examples will establish these points.
Example 1¤. X = fx;y;zg, K = fS1;S2g, S1 = X, S2 = fx;yg, C(S1) = fyg, and C(S2) = fxg. It
is easy to see that this choice function is neither G-rational nor M-rational.
Example 2¤. X = fx;y;zg, K = fS1;S2g, S1 = fx;yg, S2 = fy;zg, C(S1) = fxg and C(S2) =
fy;zg. This choice function has two G-rationalizations
R1 = f(x;y);(y;z);(z;y)g;R2 = f(x;y);(y;z);(z;y);(x;z);(z;x)g




We are now ready to investigate the structure of rational choice functions. At the out-
set, we set down the equivalence which holds between revealed preference axioms and
congruence axioms.
Theorem 1. (i) (WARP), (WCA) and the property (R¤ ½ R¤) are mutually equiva-
lent. (ii) (HARP) and (SCA) are equivalent.
Our concept of G-normality is identical with Richter’s V -axiom which he proposed
as a necessary and suﬃcient condition for G-rationality [10, p.33]. The role of our M-
rationality is made clear by the following.
Theorem 2. An M-normal choice function is G-normal.
In view of Richter’s Theorem and our Theorem 2, it is important to ﬁnd an econom-
ically meaningful condition which assures the M-normality of the choice function. This
is where the revealed preference axioms come in.
Theorem 3. A choice function satisfying (WARP) is M-normal.
By combining Theorem 2 and Theorem 3 we can see the role played by (WARP) in
the theory of rational choice.
Theorem 4. A choice function satisfying (WARP) is M- as well as G-normal.
We have seen that the concept of M-rationality and that of G-rationality coincide
if the rationalization satisﬁes the axiom of completeness. This being the case, it is
important to have the following:
Theorem 5. An M-rational choice function is complete rational.
Hansson [4] and Richter [9] showed that the necessary and suﬃcient condition for
the regular-rationality of the choice function is (HARP) or, equivalently, (SCA). On the
other hand, Theorem 4 shows us the relevance of (WARP) in the theory of rational choice.
Why do we need (SARP)? Our answer is given by the following theorem.
Theorem 6. A choice function satisfying (SARP) is acyclic and complete rational.
These theorems will be proved in the next section.
64 Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1 (i)
Step 1 [(WARP) ) (R¤ ½ R¤)]. If (R¤ ½ R¤) does not hold, we have (x;y) 2 R¤nR¤ for
some x;y 2 X. Then there exist S, S0 2 K such that x 2 C(S);y 2 S;x 2 S0;x = 2 C(S0)
and y 2 C(S0), so that we have x 2 S0 \ C(S);y 2 C(S0) \ S and x = 2 C(S0) \ S. Thus
(WARP) does not hold. Hence (WARP) implies (R¤ ½ R¤).
Step 2 [(R¤ ½ R¤) ) (WCA)]. Suppose (R¤ ½ R¤) and let (x;y) 2 R¤;x 2 S and
y 2 C(S) for any S 2 K. Then we have (x;y) 2 R¤;x 2 S and y 2 C(S), which imply
x 2 C(S) by virtue of Deﬁnition 4(b). Thus (WCA) holds.
Step 3 [(WCA) ) (WARP)]. Let C satisfy (WCA). Let (S1;S2) be a C-connected pair
in K and let x and y be taken arbitrarily from S1 \ C(S2) and C(S1) \ S2, respectively.
Because of x 2 C(S2) and y 2 S2, we have (x;y) 2 R¤ which, coupled with x 2 S1 and
y 2 C(S1), implies x 2 C(S1) thanks to (WCA). Thus we have S1 \C(S2) ½ C(S1)\S2.
Similarly we can verify that S1 \ C(S2) ¾ C(S1) \ S2. Thus (WARP) holds. k
Proof of Theorem 1 (ii)
Step 1 [(HARP) ! (SCA)]. Let (x;y) 2 T(R¤);x 2 S and y 2 C(S) for an S 2 K. Then
either (®) (x;y) 2 R¤, or (¯) there exist fz1;:::;zn¡1g ½ X and fS1;:::;Sng ½ K such
that x 2 C(S1);zk 2 Sk \ C(Sk+1)(k = 1;:::;n ¡ 1), and y 2 Sn. In case (®), we have
x 2 C(S), since (HARP) implies (WARP), which is equivalent to (WCA). In case (¯),
taking x 2 S and y 2 C(S) into consideration, (S;S1;:::;Sn) is seen to be C-connected,
so that we obtain S \ C(S1) = C(S) \ S1 by virtue of (HARP). Thus x 2 C(S). In any
case, (SCA) holds.
Step 2 [(SCA) ) (HARP)]. Let a sequence (S1;:::;Sn) in K be C-connected and
let zk and zn be taken arbitrarily from Sk \ C(Sk+1) and Sn \ C(S1), respectively (k =
1;:::;n ¡ 1). It will be shown that S1 \ C(S2) = C(S1) \ S2. By deﬁnition, we have
z1 2 S1;(z1;zn) 2 T(R¤) and zn = C(S1), so that (SCA) entails z1 2 C(S1). Noticing
z1 2 C(S2) ½ S2, we have S1 \ C(S2) ½ C(S1) \ S2. Next, let z be an arbitrary point of
C(S1)\S2. Then z 2 S2;(z;z1) 2 R¤ ½ T(R¤) and z1 2 C(S2), so that we have z 2 C(S2)
thanks to (SCA). Thus we have C(S1)\S2 ½ S1\C(S2), yielding S1\C(S2) = C(S1)\S2.
In a similar way, we can show C(Sk) \ Sk+1 = Sk \ C(Sk+1) for all k 2 f1;:::;n ¡ 1g.
Thus (HARP) is implied. k




¤(S) for all S 2 K: (6)
For any S 2 K, let x 2 C(S): Then for all y 2 S;(x;y) 2 R¤, so that x 2 G¤(S). The
other part follows from Remark 1. Thanks to (6) and Deﬁnition 9, the assertion of the
theorem holds. k
Proof of Theorem 3
In view of (6), we have only to show that (WARP) implies:
M
¤(S) ½ C(S) for all S 2 K (7)
7Let any S 2 K be ﬁxed once and for all and let x 2 M¤(S). (M¤(S) 6= ; for all
S 2 K because of (6) and Deﬁnition 3.) Then x 2 S and for all y 2 S, either (®)
[y = 2 C(S0) or x = 2 S0] for all S0 2 K, or (¯) [x 2 C(S
00) & y 2 S
00] for some S
00 2 K. Let
y 2 C(S). Then (®) cannot hold for S0 = S, so that (¯) must hold for y 2 C(S). By
virtue of (WARP), x 2 C(S) follows from x 2 S \ C(S
00) and y 2 C(S) \ S
00, entailing
(7). k
Proof of Theorem 4
By virtue of Theorem 3, (WARP) implies the M-normality of C, which implies its G-
normality, thanks to Theorem 2. The assertion of the theorem then follows from Deﬁni-
tions 8 and 9. k
Proof of Theorem 5
By M-normality, we have C(S) = M¤(S) for all S 2 K. Let R0 be deﬁned on X by:
[(x;y) 2 R
0 , (y;x) = 2 PR¤] for all x;y 2 X: (8)
Then R0 is a complete relation and, by its very deﬁnition, M¤(S) = G(S;R0) for all
S 2 K. Taking Remark 1 into consideration, the assertion of the theorem follows. k
Proof of Theorem 6
(SARP) implies (WARP), so that we have C(S) = G(S;R0) = M(S;R0) for all S 2 K
by virtue of Theorems 3 and 5, where R0 is a complete relation deﬁned by (8). Noticing
PR¤ = PR0, we have only to show (x;x) = 2 T(PR¤) for all x 2 X. Suppose, to the
contrary, that there exists an x 2 X such that (x;x) 2 T(PR¤) does hold. Then there
exist fz1;:::;zn¡1g ½ X and fS1;:::;Sng ½ K satisfying x 2 C(S1);zk 2 [SknC(Sk)] \
C(Sk+1) (k = 1;:::;n ¡ 2) and x 2 SnnC(Sn). Then (S1;:::;Sn) is a C-connected
sequence in K but Sk \ C(Sk+1) 6= C(Sk) \ Sk+1 for all k 2 f1;:::;n ¡ 1g, so that
(SARP) does not hold. Thus under (SARP), R0 must be acyclic. k
5 Counter-Examples
In this section, counter-examples are given for the converse of our Theorems. The set of
all alternatives is always taken as X = fx;y;zg.
(a) By Deﬁnition 6, (HARP) implies (SARP) which, in its turn, implies (WARP).
The converse does not hold, as was shown by Hansson [4, Theorem 5 and Theorem 6].
By Deﬁnition 7, (SCA) implies (WCA). The converse does not hold as is shown by the
following:
Example 1. K = fS1;S2;S3g;S1 = fx;yg;S2 = fy;zg;S3 = fx;zg;C(S1) = S1;C(S2)
= S2 and C(S3) = fxg. This C has a revealed preference relation
R
¤ = f(x;x);(y;y);(z;z);(x;y);(y;x);(y;z);(z;y);(x;z)g:
8(SCA) is not satisﬁed, because (z;x) 2 T(R¤);x 2 C(S3);z 2 S3 but z = 2 C(S3). On the
other hand, (WCA) is easily seen to be satisﬁed. k
(b) The converse of Theorem 2 does not hold in general; that is to say, there exists a
G-normal choice function which is not M-normal.
Example 2. K = fS1;S2g;S1 = X;S2 = fx;zg;C(S1) = fzg, and C(S2) = fx;zg.
In this case, R¤ = f(z;z);(z;x);(z;y);(x;z);(x;x)g, so that we have G¤(S1) = fzg and
G¤(S2) = fx;zg. Thus C is G-normal. But M¤(S1) = fx;zg 6= C(S1), so that C is not
M-normal. k
(c) The converse of Theorem 3 does not hold in general. An example of a choice
function which is M-rational but does not satisfy (WARP) will do.
Example 3. K = fS1;S2g;S1 = X;S2 = fy;zg;C(S1) = fx;yg and C(S2) = S2. For
this C, R¤ = f(x;x);(y;y);(z;z);(x;y);(x;z);(y;x);(y;z);(z;y)g. This C is M-normal
as can be veriﬁed. (WARP) is, however, not satisﬁed, because S1 \ C(S2) = fy;zg and
C(S1) \ S2 = fyg. k
(d) The converse of Theorem 4 is not true in general, as is shown by the following
example.
Example 4. K = fS1;S2g;S1 = X;S2 = fx;yg, C(S1) = fxg and C(S2) = S2.
Corresponding to this C, we have R¤ = f(x;x);(y;y);(x;y);(x;z);(y;x)g. Therefore,
M¤(S1) = fx;yg 6= C(S1). This C is not M-normal, hence (WARP) does not hold,
thanks to Theorem 3. But we have C(S) = G(S;R1) = M(S;R2) for all S 2 K, where
R1 = f(x;x);(y;y);(x;y);(y;x);(x;z)g and R2 = f(z;y);(x;z)g. k
(e) The converse of Theorem 5 is falsiﬁed by the following example.
Example 5. K = fS1;S2;S3g;S1 = X;S2 = fx;yg;S3 = fy;zg;C(S1) = fyg;C(S2) =
S2 and C(S3) = fyg. For this C, R¤ = f(x;x);(y;y);(x;y);(y;x);(y;z)g. This C is not
M-normal, because M¤(S1) = fx;yg 6= C(S1). But
R = f(x;y);(y;x);(y;z);(z;x);(x;x);(y;y);(z;z)g
has the property C(S) = G(S;R) for all S 2 K and R is complete, so that C is complete
rational. k
(f) The converse of Theorem 6 is falsiﬁed by the following example.
Example 6. K = fS1;S2;S3g;S1 = fx;yg;S2 = fy;zg;S3 = fx;zg;C(S1) = fxg;C(S2)
= fyg and C(S3) = S3. As can be veriﬁed,
R = f(x;x);(y;y);(z;z);(x;y);(y;z);(z;x);(x;z)g
9is an acyclic and complete relation such that C(S) = G(S;R) for all S 2 K. (SARP)
is, however, not satisﬁed, because S1 \ C(S2) = fyg;S2 \ C(S3) = fzg;S3 \ C(S1) =
fxg;C(S1) \ S2 = ; and C(S2) \ S3 = ;. k
(g) (WARP) is not strong enough to assure the acyclic and complete rationality of
the choice function.
Example 7. K = fS1;S2;S3g;S1 = fx;yg;S2 = fy;zg;S3 = fx;zg;C(S1) = fxg;C(S2)
= fyg and C(S3) = fzg. In this case, R¤ = f(x;y);(y;z);(z;x)g. We are going to show
that R¤ ½ R¤. We have (x;y) 2 R¤, because x 2 C(S1);x = 2 S2 and y = 2 C(S3). Simi-
larly z = 2 C(S1);y 2 C(S2) and y = 2 S3 entail (y;z) 2 R¤, while z = 2 S1;x = 2 C(S2) and
z 2 C(S3) show (z;x) 2 R¤. Thus, thanks to Theorem 1 (i), this choice function satisﬁes
(WARP). The unique complete rationalization thereof is, however, a cyclic one
R¤ = f(x;y);(y;z);(z;x)g: k
6 Concluding Remarks
In conclusion, let us compare our results with Arrow-Sen theory, on the one hand, and
the Richter-Hansson theory, on the other. We are concerned with a choice function C
on the family K. The choice mechanism C is said to be G-rational (resp. M-rational) if
there exists a preference relation R such that the choice set C(S) can be identiﬁed with
the set of all R-greatest points (resp. R-maximal points) in S for any possible choice
situation S 2 K. Note here that the concepts of G-rationality and M-rationality have
nothing to do with the transitivity of the rationalization R. If R happens to satisfy the
ordering axiom of completeness and transitivity, C is said to be regular-rational. Arrow
[1] and Sen [13] showed that:
(®) (SCA),(WCA),(SARP) and (WARP) are mutually equivalent necessary and suﬃ-
cient conditions for regular-rationality if K includes all the pairs and all the triples taken
from the basic set X.
It seems to us that the cost paid for the neat result (®) is rather high. Their as-
sumption on the content of K might not generally be admissible, hence depriving their
result of its general applicability. On the other hand, Richter [9] and Hansson [4] made
virtually no restrictions on the content of K and established that:
(¯) (SCA) and (HARP) are mutually equivalent necessary and suﬃcient conditions
for regular-rationality.
Later, Richter [10] extended his conceptual framework and established the following
characterization of G-rational choice functions.
(°) G-normality is a necessary and suﬃcient condition for G-rationality.
10[Insert Figure 1 around here.]
In this paper, we have systematically examined the structure of G-rational and M-
rational choice functions. The domain of the choice function is assumed simply to be
a non-empty family of non-empty sets. Thus we may reasonably claim the general ap-
plicability of our results. The role of (SARP), (WARP), (WCA) and M-normality are
clariﬁed in this general setting.
Our results, together with (¯) and (°), are summarized in Figure 1. An arrow indi-
cates implication, and cannot in general be reversed. The contrast with the Arrow-Sen
result (®) is clear.
7 Appendix
(a) The Equivalence between (1) and (WARP)
[(WARP) ) (1)] Let us assume that (x;y) 2 R¤¤ and (y;x) 2 R¤ for some x and y in
X. Then there exist S1 and S2 in K such that x 2 C(S1), y 2 S1nC(S1), x 2 S2 and
y 2 C(S2). It follows that (S1;S2) is a C-connected pair in K but y = 2 C(S1) \ S2 and
y 2 S1 \ C(S2) so that (WARP) does not hold.
[(1) ) (WARP)] Let (S1;S2) be a C-connected pair in K such that x 2 S1\C(S2) and
x = 2 C(S1)\S2 for some x in X. Then (y;x) 2 R¤¤ and (x;y) 2 R¤ for any y 2 C(S1)\S2,
negating (1).
(b)The Equivalence between (2) and (SARP)
[(SARP) ) (2)] Suppose that (x;y) 2 T(R¤¤) and (y;x) 2 R¤ for some x and y in X.
Then either (x;y) 2 R¤¤ or (x;z1),(z1;z2), :::;(zn;y) 2 R¤¤ for some z1;:::;zn 2 X.
In view of (a) and Deﬁnition 6, we have only to consider the latter case. In this case,
there exist S1;:::;Sn and S in K such that x 2 C(S1), z1 2 S1nC(S1), z1 2 C(S2),
z2 2 S2nC(S2);:::, zn 2 C(Sn+1), y 2 Sn+1nC(Sn+1), y 2 C(S) and x 2 S. Then
(S1;:::;Sn+1;S) is a C-connected sequence in K. But
z1 2 [S1 \ C(S2)]n[C(S1) \ S2];z2 2 [S2 \ C(S3)]n[C(S2) \ S3];:::;
y 2 [Sn+1 \C(S)]n[C(Sn+1)\S],
so that (SARP) does not hold.
[(2))(SARP)] Let (S1;:::;Sn) be any C-connected sequence in K. If
Sn¡1 \ C(Sn) = C(Sn¡1) \ Sn,
there remains nothing to be proved. Suppose, then, that Sn¡1 \ C(Sn) 6= C(Sn¡1) \ Sn.
Firstly, suppose that there exists an x 2 X such that x 2 C(Sn¡1)\C(Sn) and x = 2 Sn¡1\
C(Sn). In this case, for any y 2 Sn¡1 \ C(Sn), we have (x;y) 2 R¤ and (y;x) 2 R¤¤ in
contradiction to (2). Secondly, suppose that we have x = 2 C(Sn¡1)\Sn;x 2 Sn¡1\C(Sn)
and y 2 C(Sn¡1) \ Sn for some x and y in X. Here again we have (x;y) 2 R¤ and
11(y;x) 2 R¤¤ in contradiction to (2). Finally, suppose that C(Sn¡1)\Sn = ;. (S1;:::;Sn)
being a C-connected sequence in K, x 2 Sn¡1 \ C(Sn) for some x in X. If x 2 C(Sn¡1),
we have x 2 C(Sn¡1) \ C(Sn) ½ C(Sn¡1) \ Sn, a contradiction. Thus we obtain x 2
Sn¡1nC(Sn¡1). If Sn¡2\C(Sn¡1) = C(Sn¡2)\Sn¡1, there remains nothing to be proved.
Otherwise, we repeat the above procedure to obtain a zn¡1 2 [Sn¡2nC(Sn¡2)]\C(Sn¡1).
This algorithm leads us either to
Sk\C(Sk+1) = C(Sk)\Sk+1 for some k 2 f1;:::;n¡1g :::(1¤)
or to:
There exist z2;:::;zn¡1 such that z2 2 [S1nC(S1)] \ C(S2),
z3 2 [S2nC(S2)] \ C(S3);:::;zn¡1 2 [Sn¡2nC(Sn¡2)] \ C(Sn¡1) :::(2¤)
In the latter case, take a z1 2 C(S1) \ Sn. Then we obtain (z1;x) 2 T(R¤¤) and
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14Chapter 2
Houthakker’s Axiom in the Theory of
Rational Choice¤
1 Introduction
In his celebrated classic paper [4], Houthakker strengthened Samuelson’s weak axiom
of revealed preference [7, 8] into what he called semitransitivity, and showed that the
Lipschitz-continuous demand function of a competitive consumer satisfying his axiom
does possess a generating utility function.1 Uzawa [11], Arrow [1], and others extended
the conceptual framework of revealed preference theory so as to make it applicable to
a wider class of problems. Instead of conﬁning our attention to a demand function of
a competitive consumer, we are now concerned with a choice function over a family
of nonempty subsets of a basic nonempty set. A natural question suggests itself: What
property of a choice function guarantees the existence of a generating preference ordering
(GPO)? In particular, does Houthakker’s axiom, if suitably reformulated, qualify as
such? It is this problem of the existence of a GPO that constitutes the problem of
rationalizability of a choice function, which is a choice-functional counterpart of the
integrability problem in demand theory.
In the literature we have two answers to this question, depending on the extent of
the domain of a choice function. On the one hand, if the family over which a choice
function is deﬁned contains all ﬁnite subsets of the whole space, the weak axiom ensures
the existence of a GPO and that the strong axiom of revealed preference (which was so
named by Samuelson [8] and attributed to Houthakker) is equivalent to the weak axiom
[1, 9]. On the other hand, if we do not impose any such additional assumption on the
domain, the strong axiom is necessary but not suﬃcient for the existence of a GPO
[3, 10].2 Richter [5] and Hansson [3] proposed in this general setting a necessary and
¤First published in Journal of Economic Theory, Vol.14, 1977, pp.284-290. Thanks are due to Pro-
fessors W. M. Gorman and A. K. Sen for their comments. However, they should not be held responsible
for any defects remaining in this chapter.
1Further results on this problem are found in papers collected in [2]. See, especially, Uzawa [2, Chap.
1] and Hurwicz-Richter [2, Chap. 3].
2This statement is true for one version of the strong axiom, which is used by Arrow [1], Hansson [3],
Sen [9] and Suzumura [10]. More about this in the ﬁnal section.
15suﬃcient condition for the existence of a GPO, which was called the congruence axiom
by Richter.
The purpose of this paper is to show that Houthakker’s semitransitivity axiom, if suit-
ably formalized in the choice-functional context, is in fact necessary and suﬃcient for the
existence of a GPO. Therefore it follows that, contrary to the prevailing interpretation,
the strong axiom is not a legitimate formalization of Houthakker’s axiom which is equiv-
alent to the congruence axiom. In other words, Houthakker’s axiom, unlike the strong
axiom, provides us with the precise restriction on a choice function for the rationalizabil-
ity thereof, just as it provided us with the precise restriction on a Lipschitz-continuous
demand function for the integrability thereof.
2 Rationalizability
2.1. Let X be a nonempty set which stands for a ﬁxed universe of alternatives. We
assume that there is a well-speciﬁed family K of nonempty subsets of X. The pair
(X;K) will be called a choice space. A choice function on a choice space (X;K) is a
function C deﬁned on K which assigns a non-empty subset (choice set) C(S) of S to
each S 2 K.
A preference relation R on X is a binary relation on X, namely a subset of a Cartesian
product X £ X. Associated with a given preference relation R, an inﬁnite sequence of
binary relations fR(¿)g1
¿=1 is deﬁned by R(1) = R;R(¿) = f(x;y) 2 X £ Xj(x;z) 2
R(¿¡1) & (z;y) 2 R for some z 2 Xg(¿ ¸ 2). The transitive closure of R is then deﬁned
by T(R) = [1
¿=1R(¿).3 The strict preference relation PR corresponding to a preference
relation R is an asymmetric component of R:
PR = f(x;y) 2 X £ Xj(x;y) 2 R & (y;x) = 2 Rg: (1)
We say that a preference relation R is transitive if (x;y) 2 R and (y;z) 2 R imply
(x;z) 2 R, acyclic if (x;x) = 2 T(PR), and complete if either (x;y) 2 R or (y;x) 2 R for
all x and y in X. R is said to be an ordering if it is transitive and complete. For every
S 2 K, we deﬁne
G(S;R) = fx 2 Xjx 2 S & (x;y) 2 R for all y 2 Sg; (2)
which is the set of all R-greatest points in S.
2.2. A preference relation R on X is said to rationalize a choice function C on (X;K)
if we have
C(S) = G(S;R) for every S 2 K: (3)
A choice function C is said to be rational if there exists a preference relation R which
rationalizes C. (R is then called a rationalization of C.) If a choice function C is rational
3It is easy to see that T satisﬁes the axiom of closure operations: (®) R ½ T(R) for every R, (¯)
R ½ R0 implies T(R) ½ T(R0) for every R and R0, (°) T[T(R)] = T(R) for every R, and (±) T(;) = ;.
16with an acyclic rationalization, we say that C is acyclic rational. Similarly, if C is rational
with an ordering rationalization, we say that C is full rational.
2.3. Let C be a choice function on (X;K) which is ﬁxed once and for all. Two
revealed preference relations R¤ and R¤¤ are induced from C as follows. We deﬁne a
binary relation R¤ on X by
R
¤ = f(x;y) 2 X £ Xjx 2 C(S) & y 2 S for some S 2 Kg (4)
and, when (x;y) 2 R¤, we say that x is revealed R¤-preferred to y. Similarly, we deﬁne
R
¤¤ = f(x;y) 2 X £ Xjx 2 C(S) & y 2 SnC(S) for some S 2 Kg (5)
and, when (x;y) 2 R¤¤, we say that x is revealed R¤¤-preferred to y. It is easy to see that
R¤ and R¤¤ are related by the following relation:
PR¤ ½ PR¤¤ ½ R
¤¤ ½ R
¤: (6)
We have only to show that PR¤ ½ PR¤¤, the remaining inclusions in (6) being obvious by
deﬁnition. If (x;y) 2 PR¤, then we have
x 2 C(S) & y 2 S for some S 2 K; (7)
and
y = 2 C(S
0) or x = 2 S
0 for all S
0 2 K: (8)
If we apply (8) for S0 = S, this (coupled with (7)) yields
x 2 C(S) & y 2 SnC(S) for some S 2 K; (9)
while (8) implies
y = 2 C(S
0) or x = 2 S
0 or x 2 C(S
0) for all S
0 2 K: (10)
It follows from (9) and (10) that (x;y) 2 PR¤¤.
We now turn from our revealed preference relations to revealed preference axioms.
A ﬁnite sequence fx1;x2;:::;xng(n ¸ 2) in X is called an H-cycle of order n if we
have (x1;x2) 2 R¤¤;(x¿;x¿+1) 2 R¤ (¿ = 2;:::;n ¡ 1) and (xn;x1) 2 R¤. Similarly, a
ﬁnite sequence fx1;x2;:::;xng(n ¸ 2) in X is called an SH-cycle of order n if we have
(x1;x2) 2 R¤;(x¿;x¿+1) 2 R¤¤ (¿ = 2;:::;n ¡ 1) and (xn;x1) 2 R¤¤. In view of (6) it is
clear that an SH cycle of some order is an H cycle of the same order. This being the
case, the exclusion of an H cycle of any order excludes, a fortiori, the existence of an
SH cycle of any order. We now introduce the following two revealed preference axioms.
Houthakker’s Revealed Preference Axiom. There exists no H-cycle of any order.
Strong Axiom of Revealed Preference. There exists no SH-cycle of any order.
17Clearly, Houthakker’s axiom is stronger than the strong axiom. We have shown in [10]
that the strong axiom is necessary but not suﬃcient for full rationality and that it is
suﬃcient but not necessary for acyclic rationality. In the ﬁnal section we will argue
that the above-stated Houthakker’s axiom is a proper choice-functional counterpart of
Houthakker’s semitransitivity in demand theory.
2.4. We are now ready to put forward our theorem.
Rationalizability Theorem. A choice function C is full rational if and only if it satisﬁes
Houthakker’s axiom of revealed preference.
Proof of Necessity. If C is full rational with an ordering rationalization R, then
we have (3). Suppose that there exists a sequence fx1;x2;:::;xng(n ¸ 2) such that
(x1;x2) 2 R¤¤ and (x¿;x¿+1) 2 R¤ (¿ = 1;2;:::;n ¡ 1). Then there exists a sequence
fS1;S2;:::;Sn¡1g in K such that x1 2 C(S1), x2 2 S1nC(S1);x¿ 2 C(S¿), and x¿+1 2
S¿ (¿ = 2;:::;n¡1). Since C is full rational we then have (x1;x2) 2 PR and (x¿;x¿+1) 2
R (¿ = 2;:::;n ¡ 1), which entails (x1;xn) 2 PR, thanks to the transitivity of R. But
this result excludes the possibility that (xn;x1) 2 R¤, so that there exist no H-cylcle of
any order.
Proof of Suﬃciency. Let a diagonal ¢ be deﬁned by
¢ = f(x;x) 2 X £ Xjx 2 Xg; (11)
and deﬁne a binary relation Q by
Q = ¢ [ T(R
¤): (12)
It is easy to see that Q is transitive and reﬂexive: (x;x) 2 Q for all x in X. Thanks to a
corollary of Szpilrajn’s theorem [3, Lemma 3] there exists an ordering R which subsumes
Q; namely, there exists an ordering R such that
Q ½ R; (13)
and
PQ ½ PR: (14)
We are going to show that this R in fact satisﬁes
R
¤ ½ R; (15)
and
PR¤ ½ PR: (16)
The former is obvious in view of R¤ ½ T(R¤), (12), and (13). To prove the latter we
have only to show that PR¤ ½ PQ, thanks to (14). Assume (x;y) 2 PR¤, which means
(x;y) 2 R¤ and (y;x) = 2 R¤. From (x;y) 2 R¤ it follows that (x;y) 2 Q. It only remains
18to be shown that (y;x) = 2 Q. Assume, therefore, that (y;x) 2 Q. Clearly, (y;x) = 2 ¢, else
we cannot have (x;y) 2 PR¤. It follows that (y;x) 2 T(R¤), which, in combination with
(x;y) 2 PR¤ ½ R¤¤, implies the existence of an H-cycle of some order, a contradiction.
Therefore (15) and (16) are valid.
Let an S 2 K be chosen and let x 2 C(S). Then (x;y) 2 R¤ for all y 2 S. In view
of (15) we then have x 2 G(S;R). It follows that
C(S) ½ G(S;R): (17)
Next let x 2 SnC(S) and take y 2 C(S), so that (y;x) 2 R¤¤. If we have (x;y) 2 R¤
it turns out that fx;yg is an H-cycle of order 2, a contradiction. Therefore we must have
(x;y) = 2 R¤, which, in view of (y;x) 2 R¤¤ ½ R¤, implies (y;x) 2 PR¤. Thanks to (16) we
then have (y;x) 2 PR, entailing x 2 SnG(S;R). Therefore we obtain
G(S;R) ½ C(S): (18)
As (17) and (18) are valid for any S 2 K we have shown that C is full rational with an
ordering rationalization R. This completes the proof.
3 Comments on the Literature
It only remains to make some comments on the existing literature.
(i) Houthakker [4, pp.162-163] introduced his semitransitivity axiom in terms of a
demand function h on the family of competitive budgets. Let Ω;p; and m be the com-
modity space, a competitive price vector, and an income. Then h is a function on the
family of all budget sets
B(p;m) = fx 2 Ωjpx · mg: (19)
We consider a sequence fx¿gT
















¿) for at least one ¿ 2 f1;2;:::;T ¡ 1g: (22)
Houthakker’s semitransitivity then requires that x1 = 2 B(pT;pTxT). It will be noticed
that what we called Houthakker’s axiom of revealed preference in Section 2.3 is a natural
reformulation of this requirement in terms of a choice function C.
(ii) What Samuelson [8, pp. 370-371] called the strong axiom is the same requirement





¿) for every ¿ 2 f1;2;:::;T ¡ 1g: (23)
Our strong axiom of revealed preference in Section 2.3 is, it will be noticed, a natural
extension of Samuelson’s axiom in the context of a choice function.
19(iii) We have shown in [10] that Hansson’s strong axiom of revealed preference [3] is,
despite its apparent diﬀerence, equivalent to that of ours in Section 2.3.
(iv) Richter [5, p.637] argued that “the revealed preference notions employed in [the
Weak Axiom of Samuelson and the Strong Axiom of Houthakker] are relevant only to
the special case of competitive consumers, so that axioms also have meaning only in that
limited context.” However, these axioms can be and have been generalized beyond the
narrow conﬁnement of competitive consumers. Besides, Richter himself deﬁned in [6]
the weak and the strong axioms for a single-valued choice function. There is no reason,
furthermore, that we should not consider these axioms in terms of a set-valued choice
function.
In conclusion, it is hoped that our result will help to clarify the central role played
by Houthakker’s axiom in the whole spectrum of revealed preference theory.
20References
[1] Arrow, K. J., “Rational Choice Functions and Orderings,” Economica NS 26, 1959,
121-127.
[2] Chipman, J. S., L. Hurwicz, M. K. Richter and H. F. Sonnenschein, eds., Preferences,
Utility, and Demand, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, New York, 1971.
[3] Hansson, B., “Choice Structures and Preference Relations,” Synthese 18, 1968, 443-
458.
[4] Houthakker, H. S., “Revealed Preference and the Utility Function,” Economica NS
17, 1950, 159-174.
[5] Richter, M. K., “Revealed Preference Theory,” Econometrica 34, 1966, 635-645.
[6] Richter, M. K., “Rational Choice,” in J. S. Chipman et al., eds., Preferences, Utility,
and Demand, New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1971, 29-58.
[7] Samuelson, P. A., “A Note on the Pure Theory of Consumer’s Behaviour,” Econom-
ica NS 5, 1938, 61-71, 353-354.
[8] Samuelson, P. A., “The Problem of Integrability in Utility Theory,” Economica NS
17, 1950, 355-385.
[9] Sen, A. K., “Choice Functions and Revealed Preference,” Review of Economic Stud-
ies 38, 1971, 307-317.
[10] Suzumura, K., “Rational Choice and Revealed Preference,” Review of Economic
Studies 43, 1976, 149-158. Chapter 1 of this volume.
[11] Uzawa, H., “Note on Preference and Axioms of Choice,” Annals of the Institute of




Rationalizability is an important issue in the analysis of economic decisions. It provides a
means to test theories of choice, including — but not limited to — traditional consumer
demand theory. The central question to be addressed is as follows: are the observed
choices of an economic agent compatible with our standard theories of choice as being
motivated by optimizing behaviour? More precisely, can we ﬁnd a preference relation
with suitably deﬁned properties that generates the observed choices as the choice of
greatest or maximal elements according to this relation? This question has its origin in
the theory of consumer demand but has since been explored in more general contexts,
including both individual and collective choice. By formulating necessary and suﬃcient
conditions for the existence of a rationalizing relation, testable restrictions on observable
choice behaviour implied by the various theories are established.
Samuelson [12] began his seminal paper on revealed preference theory with a remark
that “[f]rom its very beginning the theory of consumer’s choice has marched steadily
towards greater generality, sloughing oﬀ at successive stages unnecessarily restrictive
conditions” (Samuelson [12, p.61]). Even after Samuelson [12; 13, Chapter V; 14; 15] laid
the foundations of “the theory of consumer’s behaviour freed from any vestigial traces
of the utility concept” (Samuelson [12, p.71]), the exercise of Ockham’s Razor persisted
within revealed preference theory. Capitalizing on Georgescu-Roegen’s [5, p.125; 15,
p.222] observation that the intuitive justiﬁcation of the axioms of revealed preference
theory has nothing to do with the special form of budget sets, but instead, is based
on the implicit consideration of choices from two-element sets. Arrow [2] expanded the
analysis of rational choice and revealed preference beyond consumer choice problems.
He pointed out that “the demand-function point of view would be greatly simpliﬁed if
the range over which the choice functions are considered to be determined is broadened
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22to include all ﬁnite sets” (Arrow, [2, p.122]). Sen [16, p.312] defended Arrow’s domain
assumption by posing two important questions: “why assume the axioms [of revealed
preference] to be true only for ‘budget sets’ and not for others?” and “[a]re there reasons
to expect that some of the rationality axioms will tend to be satisﬁed in choices over
‘budget sets’ but not for other choices?”
While it is certainly desirable to liberate revealed preference theory from the narrow
conﬁnement of budget sets, the admission of all ﬁnite subsets of the universal sets into
the domain of a choice function may well be unsuitable for many applications. In this
context, two important groups of contributions stand out. In the ﬁrst place, Richter [10;
11], Hansson [7] and Suzumura [17; 19; 20, Chapter 2] developed the theory of rational
choice and revealed preference for choice functions with general non-empty domains which
do not impose any extraneous restrictions whatsoever on the class of feasible sets. In the
second place, Sen [16] showed that Arrow’s results (as well as others with similar features)
do not hinge on the full power of the assumption that all ﬁnite sets are included in the
domain of a choice function — it suﬃces if the domain contains all two-element and
three-element sets.
It was in view of this current state of the art that Bossert, Sprumont and Suzumura
[3] examined two crucial types of general domain in an analysis of several open questions
in the theory of rational choice. The ﬁrst is the general domain ` a la Richter, Hansson
and Suzumura, and the second is the class of base domains which include all singletons
and all two-element subsets of the universal set. The status of the general domain seems
to be impeccable, as the theory developed on this domain is relevant in whatever choice
situations we may care to specify. The base domains also seem to be on safe ground, as the
concept of rational choice as maximizing choice is intrinsically connected with pairwise
comparisons: singletons can be viewed as pairs with identical components, whereas two-
element sets represent pairs of distinct alternatives. As Arrow [1, p.16] put it, “one of the
consequences of the assumptions of rational choice is that the choice in any environment
can be determined by a knowledge of the choices in two-element environments.”
In this chapter, we focus on the rationalizability of choice functions by means of
consistent relations. The concept of consistency was ﬁrst introduced by Suzumura [18],
and it is a weakening of transitivity requiring that any preference cycle should involve
indiﬀerence only. As was shown by Suzumura [18; 20, Chapter 1], consistency is necessary
and suﬃcient for the existence of an ordering extension of a binary relation. For that
reason, consistency is a central property for the analysis of rational choice as well: in order
to obtain a rationalizing relation that is an ordering, an extension procedure is, in general,
required in order to ensure that the rationalization is complete. Violations of transitivity
are quite likely to be observed in practical choice situations. For instance, Luce’s [9]
well-known coﬀee-sugar example provides a plausible argument against assuming that
indiﬀerence is always transitive: the inability of a decision-maker to perceive ‘small’
diﬀerences in alternatives is bound to lead to intransitivities. As this example illustrates,
transitivity frequently is too strong an assumption to impose in the context of individual
choice. In collective choice problems, it is even more evident that the plausibility of
transitivity can be questioned. On the other hand, it is diﬃcult to interpret observed
23choices as ‘rational’ if they do not possess any coherence property. Because of Suzumura’s
[18] result, consistency can be considered a weakening of transitivity that is minimal in
the sense that it cannot be weakened further without abandoning all hope of ﬁnding a
rationalizing ordering extension.
To further underline the importance of consistency, note that this property is precisely
what is required to prevent the problem of a ‘money pump.’ If consistency is violated,
there exists a preference cycle with at least one strict preference. In this case, the agent
under consideration is willing to trade an alternative x0 for another alternative x1 (where
‘willingness to trade’ is to be interpreted as being at least as well-oﬀ after the trade as
before), x1 for an alternative x2 and so on until we reach an alternative xK such that the
agent strictly prefers getting back x0 to retaining possession of xK. Thus, at the end of
a chain of exchanges, the agent is willing to pay a positive amount in order to get back
the alternative it had in its possession in the ﬁrst place — a classical example of a money
pump.
We examine consistent rationalizability under two domain assumptions. The ﬁrst is,
again, the general domain assumption where no restrictions whatsoever are imposed, and
the second weakens the base domain hypothesis: we merely require the domain to contain
all two-element sets but not necessarily all singletons, and we refer to those domains as
binary domains. Thus, our results are applicable in a wide range of choice problems.
Unlike many contributions to the theory of rational choice, we do not have to assume
that triples are part of the domain. Especially the ﬁrst domain assumption — the general
domain — is highly relevant because it can accommodate any choice situation that arises
in the analysis of both individual and collective choice. For instance, our results are
applicable in traditional demand theory but in more general environments as well.
Depending on the additional properties that can be imposed on rationalizations (re-
ﬂexivity and completeness), diﬀerent notions of consistent rationalizability can be deﬁned.
We characterize all but one of those notions in the general case, and all of them in the
case of binary domains. It is worth noting that we obtain full characterization results on
binary domains (in particular, on domains that do not have to contain any triples), even
though consistency imposes a restriction on possible cycles of any length.
In Section 2, the notation and our basic deﬁnitions are presented, along with some
preliminary lemmas. Section 3 develops the theory of consistent rationalizability on gen-
eral domains, whereas Section 4 expounds the corresponding theory on binary domains.
Some concluding remarks are collected in Section 5.
2 Preliminaries
The set of positive (resp. non-negative) integers is denoted by N (resp. N0). For a set
S, jSj is the cardinality of S. Let X be a universal non-empty set of alternatives. X is
the power set of X excluding the empty set. A choice function is a mapping C: Σ ! X
such that C(S) µ S for all S 2 Σ, where Σ µ X with Σ 6= ; is the domain of C. Note
that C maps Σ into the set of all non-empty subsets of X. Thus, using Richter’s [11]
terminology, the choice function C is assumed to be decisive. Let C(Σ) denote the image
24of Σ under C, that is, C(Σ) = [S2ΣC(S). In addition to arbitrary non-empty domains,
to be called general domains, we consider binary domains which are domains Σ µ X
such that fS 2 X j jSj = 2g µ Σ.
Let R µ X£X be a (binary) relation on X. The asymmetric factor P(R) of R is given
by (x;y) 2 P(R) if and only if (x;y) 2 R and (y;x) 62 R for all x;y 2 X. The symmetric
factor I(R) of R is deﬁned by (x;y) 2 I(R) if and only if (x;y) 2 R and (y;x) 2 R for all
x;y 2 X. The non-comparable factor N(R) of R is given by (x;y) 2 N(R) if and only if
(x;y) 62 R and (y;x) 62 R for all x;y 2 X.
A relation R µ X £X is (i) reﬂexive if, for all x 2 X, (x;x) 2 R; (ii) complete if, for
all x;y 2 X such that x 6= y, (x;y) 2 R or (y;x) 2 R; (iii) transitive if, for all x;y;z 2 X,
[(x;y) 2 R and (y;z) 2 R] implies (x;z) 2 R; (iv) consistent if, for all K 2 N n f1g and
for all x0;:::;xK 2 X, (xk¡1;xk) 2 R for all k 2 f1;:::;Kg implies (xK;x0) 62 P(R); (v)
P-acyclical if, for all K 2 N n f1g and for all x0;:::;xK 2 X, (xk¡1;xk) 2 P(R) for all
k 2 f1;:::;Kg implies (xK;x0) 62 P(R).
The transitive closure of R µ X £ X is denoted by R, that is, for all x;y 2 X,
(x;y) 2 R if there exist K 2 N and x0;:::;xK 2 X such that x = x0, (xk¡1;xk) 2 R for
all k 2 f1;:::;Kg and xK = y. Clearly, R is transitive and, because we can set K = 1,
it follows that R µ R. For future reference, we state the following well-known result the
proof of which is straightforward and thus omitted (see Suzumura [20, pp.11–12]).
Lemma 1 Let R and Q be binary relations on X. If R µ Q, then R µ Q.
The direct revealed preference relation RC µ X £ X of a choice function C with an
arbitrary domain Σ is deﬁned as follows. For all x;y 2 X, (x;y) 2 RC if there exists
S 2 Σ such that x 2 C(S) and y 2 S. The (indirect) revealed preference relation of C is
the transitive closure RC of the direct revealed preference relation RC.
For S 2 Σ and a relation R µ X £X, the set of R-greatest elements in S is fx 2 S j
(x;y) 2 R for all y 2 Sg, and the set of R-maximal elements in S is fx 2 S j (y;x) 62
P(R) for all y 2 Sg. A choice function C is greatest-element rationalizable if there exists
a relation R on X, to be called a G-rationalization, such that C(S) is equal to the set
of R-greatest elements in S for all S 2 Σ. C is maximal-element rationalizable if there
exists a relation R on X, to be called an M-rationalization, such that C(S) is equal to
the set of R-maximal elements in S for all S 2 Σ. We use the term rationalization in
general discussions where it is not speciﬁed whether greatest-element rationalizability or
maximal-element rationalizability is considered.
If a rationalization is required to be reﬂexive and complete, the notions of greatest-
element rationalizability and that of maximal-element rationalizability coincide. Without
these properties, however, this is not necessarily the case. Greatest-element rationaliz-
ability is based on the idea of chosen alternative weakly dominating all alternatives in
the feasible set under consideration, whereas maximal-element rationalizability requires
chosen elements not to be strictly dominated by any other feasible alternative. Speciﬁc
examples illustrating the diﬀerences between those two concepts will be discussed later.
Depending on the properties that we might want to impose on a rationalization,
diﬀerent notions of rationalizability can be deﬁned. For simplicity of presentation, we
25use the following notation. G (resp. RG; CG; RCG) stands for greatest-element ra-
tionalizability by means of a consistent (resp. reﬂexive and consistent; complete and
consistent; reﬂexive, complete and consistent) G-rationalization. Analogously, M (resp.
RM; CM; RCM) is maximal-element rationalizability by means of a consistent (resp.
reﬂexive and consistent; complete and consistent; reﬂexive, complete and consistent) M-
rationalization. Note that we do not identify consistency explicitly in these acronyms
even though it is assumed to be satisﬁed by the rationalization in question. This is be-
cause consistency is required in all of the theorems presented in this paper, so that the use
of another piece of notation would be redundant and likely increase the complexity of our
exposition. However, note that the two lemmas stated below do not require consistency.
In particular, the implication of part (i) of Lemma 3 does not apply to rationalizability
by a consistent relation; see also Theorem 1.
We conclude this section with two further preliminary results. We ﬁrst present the
following lemma, the ﬁrst part of which is due to Samuelson [12; 14]; see also Richter
[11]. It states that the direct revealed preference relation must be contained in any G-
rationalization and, moreover, that if an alternative x is directly revealed preferred to an
alternative y, then y cannot be strictly preferred to x by any M-rationalization.
Lemma 2 (i) If R is a G-rationalization of C, then RC µ R.
(ii) If R is an M-rationalization of C, then RC µ R [ N(R).
Proof. (i) Suppose that R is a G-rationalization of C and x;y 2 X are such that
(x;y) 2 RC. By deﬁnition of RC, there exists S 2 Σ such that x 2 C(S) and y 2 S.
Because R is a G-rationalization of C, we obtain (x;y) 2 R.
(ii) Suppose R is an M-rationalization of C and x;y 2 X are such that (x;y) 2 RC.
By way of contradiction, suppose (x;y) 62 R [ N(R). Therefore, (y;x) 2 P(R). Because
R maximal-element rationalizes C, this implies x 62 C(S) for all S 2 Σ such that y 2 S.
But this contradicts the hypothesis (x;y) 2 RC.
Our ﬁnal preliminary observation concerns the relationship between maximal-element
rationalizability and greatest-element rationalizability when no further restrictions are
imposed on a rationalization. This applies, in particular, when consistency is not im-
posed. Moreover, an axiom that is necessary for either form of rationalizability is pre-
sented. This requirement is referred to as the V-axiom in Richter [11]; we call it direct-
revelation coherence in order to have a systematic terminology throughout this chapter.
Direct-Revelation Coherence: For all S 2 Σ, for all x 2 S, if (x;y) 2 RC for all
y 2 S, then x 2 C(S).
Suzumura [17] establishes that, in the absence of any requirements on a rationaliza-
tion, maximal-element rationalizability implies greatest-element rationalizability. Fur-
thermore, Richter [11] shows that direct-revelation coherence is necessary for greatest-
element rationalizability by an arbitrary G-rationalization on an arbitrary domain. We
summarize these observations in the following lemma. For completeness, we provide a
proof.
26Lemma 3 (i) If C is maximal-element rationalizable, then C is greatest-element ratio-
nalizable.
(ii) If C is greatest-element rationalizable, then C satisﬁes direct-revelation coherence.
Proof. (i) Suppose R is an M-rationalization of C. It is straightforward to verify that
R0 = f(x;y) j (y;x) 62 P(R)g is a G-rationalization of C.
(ii) Suppose R is a G-rationalization of C, and let S 2 Σ and x 2 S be such that
(x;y) 2 RC for all y 2 S. By part (i) of Lemma 2, (x;y) 2 R for all y 2 S. Because R is
a G-rationalization of C, this implies x 2 C(S).
There are alternative notions of rationality such as that of Kim and Richter [8] who
proposed the concept of motivated choice: C is a motivated choice if there exist a relation
R on X, which is to be called a motivation of C, such that
C(S) = fx 2 S j (y;x) 62 R for all y 2 Sg
for all S 2 Σ. This property is implied by maximal-element rationalizability but the
converse implication is not true. Moreover, C is a motivated choice if and only if C is
greatest-element rationalizable. Indeed, R greatest-element rationalizes C if and only if
its dual Rd, which is deﬁned by
(x;y) 2 R
d , (y;x) 62 R
for all x;y 2 X, is a motivation of C.
Richter [11] shows that direct-revelation coherence is not only necessary but also suf-
ﬁcient for greatest-element rationalizability on an arbitrary domain, without any further
restrictions imposed on the G-rationalization. Moreover, the axiom is necessary and suf-
ﬁcient for greatest-element rationalizability by a reﬂexive (but otherwise unrestricted)
rationalization on an arbitrary domain. The requirement remains, of course, necessary
for greatest-element rationalizability if we restrict attention to binary domains. As shown
below, if we add consistency as a requirement on a rationalization, direct-revelation coher-
ence by itself is suﬃcient for neither greatest-element rationalizability nor for maximal-
element rationalizability, even on binary domains.
3 General Domains
In this section, we impose no restrictions on the domain Σ. We begin our analysis by
providing a full description of the logical relationships between the diﬀerent notions of
rationalizability that can be deﬁned, given our consistency assumption imposed on a
rationalization. The possible deﬁnitions of rationalizability that can be obtained depend
on whether reﬂexivity or completeness are added to consistency. Furthermore, a distinc-
tion between greatest-element rationalizability and maximal-element rationalizability is
made. For convenience, a diagrammatic representation is employed: all axioms that are
27depicted within the same box are equivalent, and an arrow pointing from one box b to
another box b0 indicates that the axioms in b imply those in b0, and no further implications
are true without additional assumptions regarding the domain of C.
Theorem 1 Suppose Σ is a general domain. Then
RCG, CG, RCM, CM
# #
RG, G RM, M
Proof. We proceed as follows. In Step 1, we prove the equivalence of all axioms that
appear in the same box. In Step 2, we show that all implications depicted in the theorem
statement are valid. In Step 3, we provide examples demonstrating that no further
implications are true in general.
Step 1. For each of the three boxes, we show that all axioms listed in the box are
equivalent.
1.a. We ﬁrst prove the equivalence of the axioms in the top box.
Clearly, RCG implies CG and RCM implies CM. Moreover, if a relation R is
reﬂexive and complete, it follows that the set of R-greatest elements in S is equal to
the set of R-maximal elements in S for any S 2 Σ. Therefore, RCG and RCM are
equivalent.
To see that CM implies RCM, suppose R is a consistent and complete M-rationalization
of C. Let
R
0 = R [ f(x;x) j x 2 Xg:
Clearly, R0 is reﬂexive. R0 is consistent and complete because R is. That R0 is an
M-rationalization of C follows immediately from the observation that R is.
To complete Step 1.a of the proof, it is suﬃcient to show that CG implies RCG.
Suppose R is a consistent and complete G-rationalization of C. Let
R0 = [R [ ¢ [ f(y;x) j x 62 C(Σ) & y 2 C(Σ)g] n f(x;y) j x 62 C(Σ) & y 2 C(Σ)g,
where ¢ = f(x;x)jx 2 Xg. Clearly, R0 is reﬂexive by deﬁnition.
To show that R0 is complete, let x;y 2 X be such that x 6= y and (x;y) 62 R0. By
deﬁnition of R0, this implies
(x;y) 62 R and [x 62 C(Σ) or y 2 C(Σ)]
or
x 62 C(Σ) and y 2 C(Σ):
28If the former applies, the completeness of R implies (y;x) 2 R and, by deﬁnition of R0,
we obtain (y;x) 2 R0. If the latter is true, (y;x) 2 R0 follows immediately from the
deﬁnition of R0.
Next, we show that R0 is consistent. Let K 2 N n f1g and x0;:::;xK 2 X be such
that (xk¡1;xk) 2 R0 for all k 2 f1;:::;Kg. Clearly, we can, without loss of generality,
assume that xk¡1 6= xk for all k 2 f1;:::;Kg. We distinguish two cases.
(i) x0 62 C(Σ). In this case, it follows that x1 62 C(Σ); otherwise we would have
(x1;x0) 2 P(R0) by deﬁnition of R0, contradicting our hypothesis. Successively applying
this argument to all k 2 f1;:::;Kg, we obtain xk 62 C(Σ) for all k 2 f1;:::;Kg. By
deﬁnition of R0, this implies (xk¡1;xk) 2 R for all k 2 f1;:::;Kg. By the consistency of
R, we must have (xK;x0) 62 P(R). Because xK 62 C(Σ), this implies, according to the
deﬁnition of R0, (xK;x0) 62 P(R0).
(ii) x0 2 C(Σ). If xK 62 C(Σ), (xK;x0) 62 P(R0) follows immediately from the deﬁnition of
R0. If xK 2 C(Σ), it follows that xK¡1 2 C(Σ); otherwise we would have (xK¡1;xK) 62 R0
by deﬁnition of R0, contradicting our hypothesis. Successively applying this argument
to all k 2 f1;:::;Kg, we obtain xk 2 C(Σ) for all k 2 f1;:::;Kg. By deﬁnition of R0,
this implies (xk¡1;xk) 2 R for all k 2 f1;:::;Kg. By the consistency of R, we must
have (xK;x0) 62 P(R). Because x0 2 C(Σ), this implies, according to the deﬁnition of
R0, (xK;x0) 62 P(R0).
Finally, we show that R0 is a G-rationalization of C. Let S 2 Σ and x 2 S.
Suppose ﬁrst that (x;y) 2 R0 for all y 2 S. If jSj = 1, x 2 C(S) follows immediately
because C(S) is non-empty. If jSj ¸ 2, we obtain x 2 C(Σ). Because R is a G-
rationalization of C, this implies (x;x) 2 R. By deﬁnition of R0, (x;z) 2 R for all
z 2 C(S). Therefore, (x;z) 2 R for all z 2 C(S)[fxg. Suppose, by way of contradiction,
that x 62 C(S). Because R is a G-rationalization of C, it follows that there exists
y 2 S n(C(S)[fxg) such that (x;y) 62 R. The completeness of R implies (y;x) 2 P(R).
Let z 2 C(S). It follows that (z;y) 2 R because R is a G-rationalization of C and, as
established earlier, (x;z) 2 R. This contradicts the consistency of R.
To prove the converse implication, suppose x 2 C(S). Because R is a G-rationalization
of C, we have (x;y) 2 R for all y 2 S. In particular, this implies (x;x) 2 R and, according
to the deﬁnition of R0, we obtain (x;y) 2 R0 for all y 2 S.
1.b. The proof that RM and M are equivalent is analogous to the proof of the
equivalence of RCM and CM in Step 1.a.
1.c. Clearly, RG implies G. Conversely, suppose R is a consistent G-rationalization
of C. Let
R
0 = (R [ ¢) n f(x;y) j x 62 C(Σ) & x 6= yg:
Clearly, R0 is reﬂexive.
Next, we prove that R0 is consistent. Let K 2 N n f1g and x0;:::;xK 2 X be such
that (xk¡1;xk) 2 R0 for all k 2 f1;:::;Kg. Again, we can assume that xk¡1 6= xk for all
29k 2 f1;:::;Kg. By deﬁnition of R0, x0 2 C(Σ). The rest of the proof follows as in part
(ii) of the consistency of the relation R0 in Step 1.a.
It remains to be shown that R0 is a G-rationalization of C. Let S 2 Σ and x 2 S.
First, suppose (x;y) 2 R0 for all y 2 S. By deﬁnition of R0, (x;y) 2 R for all
y 2 Snfxg. Analogously to the corresponding argument in Step 1.a, the assumption x 62
C(S) implies the existence of y 2 S n(C(S)[fxg) such that (x;y) 62 R, a contradiction.
Finally, suppose x 2 C(S). This implies (x;y) 2 R for all y 2 S because R is a
G-rationalization of C. Furthermore, because C(S) µ C(Σ), we have x 2 C(Σ). By
deﬁnition of R0, this implies (x;y) 2 R0 for all y 2 S.
Step 2. The implications corresponding to the arrows in the theorem statement are
straightforward.
Step 3. Given Steps 1 and 2, to prove that no further implications are valid, it is
suﬃcient to provide examples showing that (a) M does not imply G; and (b) G does not
imply M. Note that this independence of M and G in the presence of consistency does
not contradict part (i) of Lemma 3—consistency is not required in the lemma.
3.a. M does not imply G.
Example 1 Let X = fx;y;zg and Σ = ffx;yg;fx;zg;fy;zgg. For future reference,
note that Σ is a binary domain. Deﬁne the choice function C by letting C(fx;yg) =
fx;yg, C(fx;zg) = fx;zg and C(fy;zg) = fyg. This choice function is maximal-element
rationalizable by the consistent (and reﬂexive) rationalization
R = f(x;x);(y;y);(y;z);(z;z)g:
Suppose C is greatest-element rationalizable by a consistent rationalization R0. Because
C(Σ) = X, greatest-element rationalizability implies that R0 is reﬂexive. Therefore,
because y 2 C(fy;zg) and z 62 C(fy;zg), we must have (y;z) 2 R0 and (z;y) 62 R0.
Therefore, (y;z) 2 P(R0). Because R0 is a G-rationalization of C, z 2 C(fx;zg) implies
(z;x) 2 R0 and x 2 C(fx;yg) implies (x;y) 2 R0. This yields a contradiction to the
assumption that R0 is consistent.
3.b. To prove that G does not imply M, we employ an example due to Suzumura
[17, pp.151–152].
Example 2 Let X = fx;y;zg and Σ = ffx;yg;fx;zg;fx;y;zgg, and deﬁne C(fx;yg) =
fx;yg, C(fx;zg) = fx;zg and C(fx;y;zg) = fxg. This choice function is greatest-
element rationalizable by the consistent (and reﬂexive) rationalization
R = f(x;x);(x;y);(x;z);(y;x);(y;y);(z;x);(z;z)g:
Suppose R0 is an M-rationalization of C. Because z 2 C(fx;zg), maximal-element
rationalizability implies (x;z) 62 P(R0) and, consequently, z 62 C(fx;y;zg) implies
30(y;z) 2 P(R0). Analogously, y 2 C(fx;yg) implies, together with maximal-element ra-
tionalizability, (x;y) 62 P(R0) and, consequently, y 62 C(fx;y;zg) implies (z;y) 2 P(R0).
But this contradicts the above observation that we must have (y;z) 2 P(R0). Note that
consistency (or any other property) of R0 is not invoked in the above argument. More-
over, R is reﬂexive. Thus, RG does not even imply maximal-element rationalizability by
an arbitrary rationalization.
We now provide characterizations of two of the three notions of rationalizability iden-
tiﬁed in the above theorem. The ﬁrst is a straightforward consequence of Richter’s [10]
result and the observation that consistency is equivalent to transitivity in the presence of
reﬂexivity and completeness. Richter [10] shows that the congruence axiom is necessary
and suﬃcient for greatest-element rationalizability by a transitive, reﬂexive and complete
rationalization. Congruence is deﬁned as follows.
Congruence: For all x;y 2 X, for all S 2 Σ, if (x;y) 2 RC, y 2 C(S) and x 2 S, then
x 2 C(S).
We obtain the following:
Theorem 2 C satisﬁes RCG if and only if C satisﬁes congruence.
Proof. As is straightforward to verify, a relation is consistent, reﬂexive and complete if
and only if it is transitive, reﬂexive and complete. The result now follows immediately
from the equivalence of congruence and greatest-element rationalizability by a transitive,
reﬂexive and complete rationalization established by Richter [10].
In order to characterize G (and, therefore, RG; see Theorem 1), we employ the
consistent closure of the direct revealed preference relation RC. The consistent closure
of a relation R is analogous to the transitive closure: the idea is to add all pairs to the
relation R that must be in a G-rationalizing relation due to the requirement that the
rationalization be consistent. Deﬁne the consistent closure R¤ of R by
R
¤ = R [ f(x;y) j (x;y) 2 R & (y;x) 2 Rg:
Clearly, R µ R¤. To illustrate the deﬁnition of the consistent closure and its relationship
to the transitive closure, consider the following examples.
Example 3 Let X = fx;y;zg and R = f(x;x);(x;y);(y;y);(y;z);(z;x);(z;z)g. We
obtain R¤ = R = X £ X.
Example 4 Let X = fx;y;zg and R = f(x;y);(y;z)g. We have R¤ = R and R =
f(x;y);(y;z);(x;z)g.
In Example 3, the consistent closure coincides with the transitive closure, whereas in Ex-
ample 3, the consistent closure is a strict subset of the transitive closure. More generally,
R¤ is always a subset of R; see Lemma 4 below. Moreover, the lemma establishes an
important property of R¤: just as R is the smallest transitive relation containing R, R¤
is the smallest consistent relation containing R.
31Lemma 4 Let R be a binary relation on X.
(i) R¤ µ R.
(ii) R¤ is the smallest consistent relation containing R.
Proof. (i) Suppose that (x;y) 2 R¤. By deﬁnition,
(x;y) 2 R or [(x;y) 2 R & (y;x) 2 R]:
If (x;y) 2 R, (x;y) 2 R follows because R µ R. If [(x;y) 2 R & (y;x) 2 R], (x;y) 2 R
is implied trivially.
(ii) We ﬁrst prove that R¤ is consistent. Suppose K 2 N n f1g and x0;:::;xK 2 X
are such that (xk¡1;xk) 2 R¤ for all k 2 f1;:::;Kg. We show that (xK;x0) 62 P(R¤).




K) 2 R: (1)
If (xK;x0) 62 R¤, we immediately obtain (xK;x0) 62 P(R¤) and we are done. Now
suppose that (xK;x0) 2 R¤. By deﬁnition of R¤, we must have
(x
K;x
0) 2 R or [(x
K;x
0) 2 R & (x
0;x
K) 2 R]:
If (xK;x0) 2 R, (1) and the deﬁnition of R¤ together imply (x0;xK) 2 R¤ and, thus,
(xK;x0) 62 P(R¤). If (xK;x0) 2 R and (x0;xK) 2 R, (x0;xK) 2 R¤ follows because
R µ R¤. Again, this implies (xK;x0) 62 P(R¤) and the proof that R¤ is consistent is
complete.
To show that R¤ is the smallest consistent relation containing R, suppose that Q is
an arbitrary consistent relation containing R. To complete the proof, we establish that
R¤ µ Q. Suppose that (x;y) 2 R¤. By deﬁnition of R¤,
(x;y) 2 R or [(x;y) 2 R & (y;x) 2 R]:
If (x;y) 2 R, (x;y) 2 Q follows because R is contained in Q by assumption. If (x;y) 2 R
and (y;x) 2 R, Lemma 1 and the assumption R µ Q together imply that (x;y) 2 Q and
(y;x) 2 Q. If (x;y) 62 Q, we obtain (y;x) 2 P(Q) in view of (y;x) 2 Q. Since (x;y) 2 Q,
this contradicts the consistency of Q. Therefore, we must have (x;y) 2 Q.
Analogously to Lemma 2 (i), we obtain the following:
Lemma 5 If R is a consistent G-rationalization of C, then R¤
C µ R.
Proof. Suppose that R is a consistent G-rationalization of C and (x;y) 2 R¤
C. By
deﬁnition,
(x;y) 2 RC or [(x;y) 2 RC & (y;x) 2 RC]:
If (x;y) 2 RC, Lemma 2 implies (x;y) 2 R. If (x;y) 2 RC and (y;x) 2 RC, Lemmas 2 and
1 together imply (x;y) 2 R and (y;x) 2 R. If (x;y) 62 R, it follows that (y;x) 2 P(R) in
32view of (y;x) 2 R. Because (x;y) 2 R, this contradicts the consistency of R. Therefore,
(x;y) 2 R.
Part (ii) of Lemma 2 does not generalize in an analogous fashion. To see this, consider
again Example 1. We have R¤
C = X £ X and, therefore, (z;y) 2 R¤
C. But (y;z) 2 P(R)
according to the consistent M-rationalization R deﬁned in the example, and it follows
that R¤
C 6µ R [ N(R).
The following axiom is a strengthening of direct-revelation coherence which we call
consistent-closure coherence. It is obtained by replacing RC with its consistent closure
R¤
C in the deﬁnition of direct-revelation coherence.
Consistent-Closure Coherence: For all S 2 Σ, for all x 2 S, if (x;y) 2 R¤
C for all
y 2 S, then x 2 C(S).
We now obtain the following:
Theorem 3 C satisﬁes G if and only if C satisﬁes consistent-closure coherence.
Proof. To prove the only-if part of the theorem, suppose R is a consistent G-rationalization
of C and let S 2 Σ and x 2 S be such that (x;y) 2 R¤
C for all y 2 S. By Lemma 5,
(x;y) 2 R for all y 2 S. Thus, because R is a G-rationalization of C, x 2 C(S).
Now suppose C satisﬁes consistent-closure coherence. We complete the proof by
showing that R¤
C is a consistent G-rationalization of C. That R¤
C is consistent follows
from Lemma 4. To prove that R¤
C is a G-rationalization of C, suppose ﬁrst that S 2 Σ
and x 2 S. Suppose (x;y) 2 R¤
C for all y 2 S. Consistent-closure coherence implies
x 2 C(S). Conversely, suppose x 2 C(S). By deﬁnition, this implies (x;y) 2 RC for all
y 2 S and, because RC µ R¤
C, we obtain (x;y) 2 R¤
C for all y 2 S.
4 Binary Domains
We now turn to the special case of binary domains. These domains are of interest because
they represent a natural weakening of some domains studied in the earlier literature on
rational choice. In particular, the binary-domain assumption is implied by the require-
ment that Σ contains all non-empty and ﬁnite subsets of X, by the assumption that the
domain contains all pairs and all triples and by the requirement that Σ is a base domain.
Moreover, binary domains occur naturally in applications such as tournaments where
a pairwise comparison of all agents is performed; consider, for example, a round-robin
tournament.
In the case of binary domains, the presence of all two-element sets in Σ guarantees that
every G-rationalization must be complete and, as a consequence, all rationality require-
ments involving greatest-element rationalizability and consistency become equivalent. In
contrast, maximal-element rationalizability by a consistent and complete rationalization
remains a stronger requirement than maximal-element rationalizability by a consistent
and reﬂexive rationalization. These observations are summarized in the following theo-
rem.
33Theorem 4 Suppose Σ is a binary domain. Then
RCG, CG, RCM, CM, RG, G
#
RM, M
Proof. We divide the proof into the same three steps as in Theorem 1.
Step 1. We prove the equivalence of the axioms for each of the two boxes.
1.a. Using Theorem 1, the equivalence of the axioms in the top box follows from the
observation that any consistent G-rationalization of C must be complete, given that Σ
is binary.
1.b. This part is already proven in Theorem 1.
Step 2. Again, the implication corresponding to the arrow in the theorem statement
is straightforward.
Step 3. To prove that the reverse implication is not valid, Example 1 can be em-
ployed.
As shown in Theorem 4, there are only two diﬀerent versions of rationalizability for
binary domains. Consequently, we can restrict attention to the rationalizability axioms
G and M in this case, keeping in mind that, by Theorem 4, all other rationalizability
requirements involving consistent rationalizations are covered as well. Although there are
some analogies between the results in this section and some of the theorems established
in Bossert, Sprumont and Suzumura [3], our characterizations are novel because, unlike
the earlier paper, they employ consistency and they apply to binary domains rather than
base domains.
First, we show that G (and all other axioms that are equivalent to it according
to Theorem 4) is characterized by the following weak congruence axiom (see Bossert,
Sprumont and Suzumura, [3]).
Weak Congruence: For all x;y;z 2 X, for all S 2 Σ, if (x;y) 2 RC, (y;z) 2 RC, x 2 S
and z 2 C(S), then x 2 C(S).
In contrast to congruence, weak congruence applies not to chains of direct revealed pref-
erence of an arbitrary length, but merely to chains involving three elements. For binary
domains, weak congruence is necessary and suﬃcient for all forms of greatest-element
rationalizability involving a consistent G-rationalization.
Theorem 5 Suppose Σ is a binary domain. C satisﬁes G if and only if C satisﬁes weak
congruence.
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Moreover, as mentioned earlier, consistency is equivalent to transitivity in the presence
of reﬂexivity and completeness. Theorem 3 in Bossert, Sprumont and Suzumura [3] states
that greatest-element rationalizability by a reﬂexive, complete and transitive relation is
equivalent to weak congruence, provided that Σ is a binary domain. The result follows
immediately as a consequence of this observation.
Finally, we establish that direct-revelation coherence and P-acyclicity of RC together
are necessary and suﬃcient for M (and RM) on a binary domain. This result is analogous
to the characterization of greatest-element rationalizability by a P-acyclical, reﬂexive and
complete rationalization on base domains (domains that contain all singletons in addition
to all two-element sets) in Bossert, Sprumont and Suzumura ([3, Theorem 5]).
Theorem 6 Suppose Σ is a binary domain. C satisﬁes M if and only if C satisﬁes
direct-revelation coherence and RC is P-acyclical.
Proof.
Step 1. We ﬁrst show that M implies that RC is P-acyclical (that direct-revelation
coherence is implied follows from Lemma 3). Suppose R is a consistent M-rationalization
of C. By way of contradiction, suppose RC is not P-acyclical. Then there exist K 2
N n f1g and x0;:::;xK 2 X such that (xk¡1;xk) 2 P(RC) for all k 2 f1;:::;Kg and
(xK;x0) 2 P(RC). Because Σ is a binary domain, fxk¡1;xkg 2 Σ for all k 2 f1;:::;Kg
and fx0;xKg 2 Σ. By deﬁnition of RC, it follows that xk 62 C(fxk¡1;xkg) for all k 2
f1;:::;Kg and x0 62 C(fx0;xKg). Because R is an M-rationalization of C, it follows
that (xk¡1;xk) 2 P(R) for all k 2 f1;:::;Kg and (xK;x0) 2 P(R), contradicting the
consistency of R.
Step 2. We show that direct-revelation coherence and the P-acyclicity of RC together
imply M. Deﬁne R = P(RC). Clearly, P(R) = R = P(RC) and, consequently, R is
consistent because RC is P-acyclical.
It remains to be shown that R is an M-rationalization of C. Let S 2 Σ and x 2 S.
Suppose ﬁrst that x is R-maximal in S, that is, (y;x) 62 P(R) for all y 2 S. If S = fxg,
x 2 C(S) follows from the non-emptiness of C(S). Now suppose S 6= fxg, and let
y 2 S n fxg. Because Σ is a binary domain, fx;yg 2 Σ. If x 2 C(fx;yg), we obtain
(x;y) 2 RC by deﬁnition. If x 62 C(fx;yg), it follows that (y;x) 2 RC and, because
(y;x) 62 P(R) = P(RC) by assumption, we again obtain (x;y) 2 RC. By direct-revelation
coherence, it follows that x 2 C(S).
Now suppose x 2 C(S). This implies (x;y) 2 RC for all y 2 S and, therefore,
(y;x) 62 P(RC) = P(R) for all y 2 S. Therefore, x is R-maximal in S.
5 Concluding Remarks
The only notion of consistent rationalizability that is not characterized in this chapter is
maximal-element rationalizability by means of a consistent (and reﬂexive) rationalization
35on a general domain. The reason why it is diﬃcult to obtain necessary and suﬃcient
conditions in that case is the existential nature of the requirements for maximal-element
rationalizability. It is immediately apparent that the revealed preference relation must
be respected by any greatest-element rationalization, whereas this is not the case for
maximal-element rationalizability (see Lemma 3). In order to exclude an element from a
set of chosen alternatives according to maximal-element rationalizability, it merely is re-
quired that there exists (at least) one element in that set which is strictly preferred to the
alternative to be excluded. The problem of identifying necessary and suﬃcient conditions
for that kind of rationalizability is closely related to the problem of determining the di-
mension of a quasi-ordering; see, for example, Dushnik and Miller [4]. Because this is an
area that is still quite unsettled, it is not too surprising that characterizations of maximal-
element rationalizability on general domains are diﬃcult to obtain. To the best of our
knowledge, this is a feature that is shared by all notions of maximal-element rationaliz-
ability that are not equivalent to one of the notions of greatest-element rationalizability
on general domains: we are not aware of any characterization results for maximal-element
rationalizability on general domains unless the notion of maximal-element rationalizabil-
ity employed happens to coincide with one of the notions of greatest-element rationaliz-
ability. Thus, there are important open questions to be addressed in future work in this
area of research.
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38Chapter 4
Rationalizability of Choice Functions on
General Domains Without Full Transitivity¤
1 Introduction
The intuitive conception of rational choice as optimizing behaviour, irrespective of the na-
ture of the objective to be optimized (be it by a single agent or by a group of individuals),
has been studied extensively in the literature. Beginning with the revealed preference
theory of consumer demand on competitive markets, which is due to Samuelson [11; 12,
Chapter V; 13; 14] and Houthakker [6], the early phase of the theory of rational choice
was devoted to the analysis of choices from budget sets only.
Uzawa [22] and Arrow [1] freed this theory from this exclusive concern by introducing
the general concept of a choice function deﬁned on the domain of all subsets of a universal
set of alternatives. Following this avenue, Sen [16; 17], Schwartz [15], Bandyopadhyay and
Sengupta [2], and many others succeeded in characterizing optimizing choice correspond-
ing to ﬁne demarcations in the degree of consistency of the objective to be maximized.
Most notably, the theory of rational choice on such full domains was greatly simpliﬁed
by the equivalence results between several revealed preference axioms, for example, the
weak axiom of revealed preference and the strong axiom of revealed preference, whose
subtle diﬀerence had been regarded as lying at the heart of the integrability problem for
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39a competitive consumer. However, this simpliﬁcation was obtained at a price which some
may think is much too high. Instead of assuming that the domain of a choice function
consists solely of the set of budget sets, it is assumed that “the domain includes all ﬁnite
subsets of [the universal set of alternatives for choice] whether or not it includes any other
subset” (Sen [16; 17, p.47]). It deserves emphasis that “it is not necessary that even all
ﬁnite sets be included in the domain. All the results and proofs would continue to hold
even if the domain includes all pairs and triples but not all ﬁnite sets” (Sen, [16; 17,
pp.48-49]).
Whatever stance one may want to take vis-` a-vis Sen’s argument in favor of his domain
assumption, it is interesting to see what we can make of the concept of a rational choice
function irrespective of which assumption we care to specify on its domain, thereby focus-
ing directly on what the logic of rational choice — and nothing else — entails in general.
A crucial step along this line was taken by Richter [9, 10], Hansson [4] and Suzumura [19;
20; 21, Chapter 2] who assumed the domain of a choice function to be an arbitrary family
of non-empty subsets of an arbitrary non-empty universal set of alternatives without any
algebraic or topological structure. These authors succeeded in axiomatizing the concept of
a fully rational choice function, that is, a choice function resulting from the optimization
of an underlying transitive preference ordering. Yet, “cold winds blow through unstruc-
tured sets” (Howard [7, p.xvii]), and there remains a large gap between the theory of
rational choice functions with the Arrow-Sen domain and that with the Richter-Hansson
domain. In more concrete terms, the Richter-Hansson approach has not yet delivered
an axiomatization of rational choice functions where the underlying preference relation is
not fully transitive but possesses weaker properties such as quasi-transitivity or acyclicity.
Such weakenings of transitivity are particularly relevant in the context of social choice.
The purpose of this chapter is to narrow down this gap along two lines.
In the ﬁrst place, we focus on choice functions deﬁned on what we call base domains,
which contain all singletons and pairs of alternatives included in some universal set. On
these domains, we provide axiomatizations of choice functions rationalized by preference
relations that are not fully transitive. In addition, a new characterization of transitive
rational choice is provided for those domains. The concept of a rational choice as an
optimizing choice is binary in nature in that the choice from any (possibly very large) set
is to be accounted for in terms of a binary relation. In this sense, base domains seem to
be the most natural domains to work with in the theory of rational choice. Triples need
not be included in a base domain even though consistency properties involving three or
more alternatives (namely, quasi-transitivity and acyclicity) are imposed, a feature which
40distinguishes our approach from the Arrow-Sen framework.
In the second place, we develop new necessary conditions for choice functions deﬁned
on arbitrary domains to be rationalized by preference relations that are merely quasi-
transitive or acyclical. Furthermore, in the acyclical case, we present a new suﬃcient
condition, and we prove that it is weaker than a set of suﬃcient conditions in the earlier
literature.
Within the context of the consistency properties of transitivity, quasi-transitivity, and
acyclicity, we also explore the implications of all possible notions of rational choice as
an optimizing choice both on arbitrary domains and on base domains. Furthermore, we
analyze both maximal-element rationalizability and greatest-element rationalizability (see
Sen [18], for example).
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the concept
of rationalizability, along with some preliminary observations. Logical relationships are
examined in Section 3. Section 4 contains our characterization results on base domains. In
Section 5, we present suﬃcient conditions and necessary conditions on arbitrary domains.
Section 6 concludes.
2 Rationalizable Choice Functions
The set of positive (resp. non-negative) integers is denoted by N (resp. N0). For a set S,
jSj is the cardinality of S. Let X be a universal non-empty set of alternatives. X is the
power set of X excluding the empty set. A choice function is a mapping C:Σ ! X such
that C(S) µ S for all S 2 Σ, where Σ µ X with Σ 6= ; is the domain of C. In addition
to arbitrary non-empty domains, we consider binary domains which are domains Σ µ X
such that fS 2 X j jSj = 2g µ Σ, and base domains which are domains Σ µ X such that
fS 2 X j jSj = 1 or jSj = 2g µ Σ.
Let R µ X £X be a binary relation on X. The asymmetric factor P(R) of R is given
by (x;y) 2 P(R) if and only if (x;y) 2 R and (y;x) 62 R for all x;y 2 X.
A relation R µ X £ X is (i) reﬂexive if, for all x 2 X, (x;x) 2 R; (ii) complete if, for
all x;y 2 X such that x 6= y, (x;y) 2 R or (y;x) 2 R; (iii) transitive if, for all x;y;z 2 X,
[(x;y) 2 R and (y;z) 2 R] implies (x;z) 2 R; (iv) quasi-transitive if P(R) is transitive;
(v) acyclical if, for all K 2 N n f1g and for all x0;:::;xK 2 X, (xk¡1;xk) 2 P(R) for all
k 2 f1;:::;Kg implies (xK;x0) 62 P(R); (vi) asymmetric if, for all x;y 2 X, (x;y) 2 R
implies (y;x) 62 R.
The transitive closure of R µ X £ X is denoted by R, that is, for all x;y 2 X,
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(xk¡1;xk) 2 R for all k 2 f1;:::;Kg. Clearly, R is transitive and, because we can set
K = 1, it follows that R µ R.
The direct revealed preference relation RC µ X £ X of a choice function C with an
arbitrary domain Σ is deﬁned as follows. For all x;y 2 X, (x;y) 2 RC if there exists
S 2 Σ such that x 2 C(S) and y 2 S. The (indirect) revealed preference relation of
C is the transitive closure RC of the direct revealed preference relation RC. If Σ is a
base domain, the base relation BC µ X £ X of C is deﬁned by letting, for all x;y 2 X,
(x;y) 2 BC if x 2 C(fx;yg).
For S 2 Σ and a relation R µ X £ X, the set of R-greatest elements in S is
G(S;R) = fx 2 S j (x;y) 2 R for all y 2 Sg, and the set of R-maximal elements in
S is M(S;R) = fx 2 S j (y;x) 62 P(R) for all y 2 Sg. A choice function C is greatest-
element rationalizable if there exists a relation R on X such that C(S) = G(S;R) for all
S 2 Σ. C is maximal-element rationalizable if there exists a relation R on X such that
C(S) = M(S;R) for all S 2 Σ.
Ours is the standard deﬁnition of maximal-element rationalizability that is used in the
traditional literature on rational (social and individual) choice. We are aware that there
are interesting alternatives such as that of Kim and Richter [8] who proposed the concept
of motivated choice: C is a motivated choice if there exists a relation R on X, which is to
be called a motivation of C, such that
C(S) = fx 2 S j (y;x) 62 R for all y 2 Sg
for all S 2 Σ. This property is implied by maximal-element rationalizability but the
converse implication is not true. Moreover, C is a motivated choice if and only if C is
greatest-element rationalizable. Indeed, R greatest-element rationalizes C if and only if
its dual Rd, deﬁned by
(x;y) 2 R
d , (y;x) 62 R
for all x;y 2 X, is a motivation of C. Because our version of maximal-element ratio-
nalizability has been employed extensively in the literature and because we think it has
strong intuitive appeal, we use it in this chapter. In fact, the analysis of the diﬀerences
that emerge between the two traditional versions of rationalizability once full transitivity
is no longer required is one of the major purposes of this chapter.
Depending on the properties that we might want to impose on a rationalizing rela-
tion, diﬀerent notions of rationalizability can be deﬁned. In particular, our focus is on
transitivity, quasi-transitivity, and acyclicity. We refer to those properties as consistency
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reﬂexivity, and completeness, respectively. Each notion of rationalizability is identiﬁed
by a list of properties assumed to be satisﬁed by the rationalizing relation, followed by
the type of rationalizability (greatest-element or maximal-element rationalizability). For
example, QC-G means greatest-element rationalizability by a quasi-transitive and com-
plete relation, ARC-M is maximal-element rationalizability by an acyclical, reﬂexive, and
complete relation, etc.
We conclude this section with some preliminary results. We ﬁrst present the following
lemma, due to Samuelson [11; 13]; see also Richter [10]. It states that the direct revealed
preference relation must be contained in any greatest-element rationalizing relation.
Lemma 1 (Samuelson [11; 13]) If R greatest-element rationalizes C, then RC µ R.
If R is transitive and greatest-element rationalizes C, it also follows that the strict
preference relation corresponding to RC must be contained in the strict preference relation
of R, that is, P(RC) µ P(R) (see Bossert [3]). On an arbitrary domain, this result is no
longer true if transitivity is weakened to quasi-transitivity.
Example 1 Let X = fx;yg, Σ = ffx;ygg, and C(fx;yg) = fxg. The relation R deﬁned
by
R = f(x;x);(x;y);(y;x)g
is quasi-transitive and greatest-element rationalizes C but we have
P(RC) = f(x;y)g 6µ ; = P(R):
Even if a greatest-element rationalizing relation R is reﬂexive and complete, P(RC)
need not be contained in P(R).
Example 2 Let X = fx;y;z;wg, Σ = ffx;zg;fx;y;wgg, and deﬁne C(fx;zg) = fzg
and C(fx;y;wg) = fx;wg. The relation R given by
R = (X £ X) n f(x;z);(y;w)g
is quasi-transitive, reﬂexive, and complete and greatest-element rationalizes C. We have
(x;y) 2 P(RC) and (x;y) 62 P(R) and, hence, P(RC) 6µ P(R).
The implication discussed above does hold on a base domain even if no consistency
requirement such as transitivity, quasi-transitivity or acyclicity is imposed.
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P(RC) µ P(R).
Proof. Suppose (x;y) 2 P(RC) for some x;y 2 X. This implies (x;y) 2 RC and, by
Lemma 1, (x;y) 2 R. By way of contradiction, suppose (y;x) 2 R. Because Σ is a base
domain, fyg 2 Σ. By the non-emptiness of C(fyg), y 2 C(fyg). Hence, (y;y) 2 RC
and, using Lemma 1 again, (y;y) 2 R. Because Σ is a base domain, fx;yg 2 Σ. Because
(y;x) 2 R, (y;y) 2 R, and R greatest-element rationalizes C, we must have y 2 C(fx;yg)
and hence (y;x) 2 RC. But this contradicts the assumption that (x;y) 2 P(RC).
A ﬁnal preliminary observation concerns an axiom that is necessary for greatest-
element rationalizability even without any restrictions on a rationalizing relation. This
requirement is referred to as the V-axiom in Richter [10]; we call it D-congruence (D for
“direct revelation”) in order to have a systematic terminology throughout this chapter.
D-Congruence: For all S 2 Σ, for all x 2 S, if (x;y) 2 RC for all y 2 S, then x 2 C(S).
We state Richter’s [10] result that D-congruence is necessary for greatest-element ratio-
nalizability by an arbitrary relation on an arbitrary domain.
Lemma 3 (Richter [10]) If C is greatest-element rationalizable, then C satisﬁes D-
congruence.
Richter [10] shows that D-congruence is not only necessary but also suﬃcient for
greatest-element rationalizability by an arbitrary binary relation on an arbitrary domain.
Moreover, the axiom is necessary and suﬃcient for greatest-element rationalizability by a
reﬂexive (but otherwise unrestricted) relation on an arbitrary domain. The requirement
remains, of course, necessary for rationalizability if we restrict attention to base domains.
However, if we add a consistency requirement such as transitivity, quasi-transitivity, or
acyclicity, D-congruence by itself is not suﬃcient for rationalizability, even on base do-
mains.
3 Logical Relationships
We provide a full description of the logical relationships between the diﬀerent notions of
rationalizability that can be deﬁned in this setting. The possible deﬁnitions of rationaliz-
ability that can be obtained depend subtly on which consistency requirement is adopted
(namely, transitivity, quasi-transitivity or acyclicity) and on whether reﬂexivity or com-
pleteness are added. Furthermore, a distinction between greatest-element rationalizability
44and maximal-element rationalizability is made. Note that, without any additional proper-
ties, maximal-element rationalizability implies greatest-element rationalizability but this
implication is no longer valid if additional properties are imposed on a rationalization; see
Theorem 1 below.
We state all logical relationships between the diﬀerent notions of rationality analyzed
in this chapter in two theorems — one for arbitrary domains and one for base domains.
For convenience, a diagrammatic representation is employed: all axioms that are depicted
within the same box are equivalent, and an arrow pointing from one box b to another box
b0 indicates that the axioms in b imply those in b0, and the converse implication is not
true. In addition, of course, all implications resulting from chains of arrows depicted in
the diagram are valid.
Theorem 1 Suppose Σ is a general domain. Then
TRC-G, TC-G, TR-G, T-G, TRC-M, TC-M
#
TR-M, T-M, QRC-G, QRC-M, QC-M, QR-M, Q-M
# #




AR-G, A-G Ã Q-G
Proof. We proceed as follows. In Step 1, we prove the equivalence of all axioms that
appear in the same box. In Step 2, we show that all implications depicted in the theorem
statement are valid. In Step 3, we demonstrate that no further implications are true other
than those resulting from chains of implications established in Step 2.
Step 1. We prove the equivalence of the axioms for each of the four boxes containing
more than one axiom.
1.a. We ﬁrst prove the equivalence of the axioms in the top box.
That TRC-G, TC-G, TR-G, and T-G are equivalent follows directly from Richter’s [9;
10] results.
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relation, it follows that TRC-G and TRC-M are equivalent.
Finally, we show that TC-M implies TRC-M. Suppose R is a transitive and complete
relation that maximal-element rationalizes C, that is, C(S) = M(S;R) for all S 2 Σ. Let
R
0 = R [ f(x;x) j x 2 Xg:
It follows immediately that R0 is reﬂexive, complete, and transitive. Furthermore, P(R0) =
P(R) and, therefore, M(S;R0) = M(S;R) = C(S) for all S 2 Σ, which implies that R0
maximal-element rationalizes C.
1.b. Next, we prove that the axioms in the second box from the top are equivalent.
That TR-M and T-M are equivalent can be shown using the same construction as in
the proof of the equivalence of TRC-M and TC-M.
Clearly, QRC-G and QRC-M are equivalent because greatest and maximal elements
coincide for a reﬂexive and complete relation.
Next, we show that Q-M implies QRC-M. Suppose R is a quasi-transitive relation that
maximal-element rationalizes C. Deﬁne R0 by
R
0 = f(x;y) 2 X £ X j (y;x) 62 P(R)g: (1)
Regardless of the properties possessed by R, R0 is always reﬂexive and complete and,
furthermore, P(R0) = P(R) and hence
G(S;R
0) = M(S;R
0) = M(S;R) for all S 2 Σ: (2)
Since R is quasi-transitive and P(R0) = P(R), R0 is quasi-transitive as well.
That R0 maximal-element rationalizes C follows immediately from (2) and the as-
sumption that R maximal-element rationalizes C.
To complete this part of the proof, it is suﬃcient to establish the equivalence of T-M
and QRC-G.
First, we show that T-M implies QRC-G. Suppose C is maximal-element rationalizable
by a transitive relation R. Deﬁne the relation R0 as in (1). As in the argument proving
the previous implication, R0 is quasi-transitive, reﬂexive, and complete, and (2) implies
that R0 greatest-element rationalizes C.
To prove that QRC-G implies T-M, suppose R is a quasi-transitive, reﬂexive, and
complete relation that greatest-element rationalizes C. Deﬁne
R
0 = P(R):
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hence
M(S;R
0) = M(S;R) = G(S;R) for all S 2 Σ; (3)
where the second equality follows from reﬂexivity and completeness of R. Since R greatest-
element rationalizes C it follows from (3) that R0 maximal-element rationalizes C.
1.c. We prove that the axioms ARC-G and all axioms involving maximal-element
rationalizability by an acyclical relation are equivalent.
Again, the equivalence of ARC-G and ARC-M follows immediately because the great-
est and maximal elements of a reﬂexive and complete relation coincide.
Finally, we show that A-M implies ARC-M. Suppose R is an acyclical relation that
maximal-element rationalizes C. Deﬁne R0 as in (1). Again, it is clear that R0 is reﬂexive
and complete. Since R is acyclical and P(R0) = P(R), R0 is acyclical as well. The
argument showing that R0 maximal-element rationalizes C is identical to the one used in
1.b.
1.d. To complete the ﬁrst part of the proof, it remains to be shown that A-G implies
AR-G. Suppose R is acyclical and greatest-element rationalizes C. Deﬁne
R
0 = (R [ f(x;x) j x 2 Xg) n f(x;y) 2 X £ X j (x;x) 62 R and y 6= xg: (4)
Clearly, R0 is reﬂexive. Furthermore, by deﬁnition of R0, we have
[(x;x) 62 R ) (x;y) 62 R
0] for all x 2 X; for all y 2 X n fxg: (5)
Now suppose R0 is not acyclical. Then there exist K 2 N n f1g and x0;:::;xK 2 X
such that (xk¡1;xk) 2 P(R0) for all k 2 f1;:::;Kg and (xK;x0) 2 P(R0). Clearly, we can,
without loss of generality, assume that the xk are pairwise distinct. By (5), (xk¡1;xk¡1) 2
R for all k 2 f1;:::;K + 1g. But this implies that we have (xk¡1;xk) 2 P(R) for all
k 2 f1;:::;Kg and (xK;x0) 2 P(R) by deﬁnition of R0, contradicting the acyclicity of R.
We now prove that R0 greatest-element rationalizes C. For future reference, note that
the argument used in the proof does not depend on any of the properties of R other than
the observation that it greatest-element rationalizes C. Let S 2 Σ and x 2 S.
Suppose x 2 C(S). Because R greatest-element rationalizes C, we have (x;y) 2 R for
all y 2 S which, in particular, implies (x;x) 2 R. Therefore, by (4), (x;y) 2 R0 for all
y 2 S and hence x 2 G(S;R0).
Now suppose x 2 G(S;R0). Therefore, (x;y) 2 R0 for all y 2 S. If S = fxg, x 2 C(S)
follows from the non-emptiness of C(S). If there exists y 2 S such that y 6= x, (5)
47implies (x;x) 2 R. Therefore, because (x;y) 2 R0 implies (x;y) 2 R for all y 2 S and R
greatest-element rationalizes C, we immediately obtain x 2 C(S).
Step 2. The only non-trivial implication is that QC-G implies QR-G. Suppose R is
quasi-transitive and complete and greatest-element rationalizes C. Deﬁne the (reﬂexive)
relation R0 as in (4). Next, we prove that R0 is quasi-transitive. Suppose (x;y) 2 P(R0)
and (y;z) 2 P(R0). By (5), (x;x) 2 R and (y;y) 2 R. Suppose (x;y) 62 P(R). Because
R is complete, we have (y;x) 2 R. Because (y;y) 2 R, it follows that (y;x) 2 R0 by
deﬁnition of R0, contradicting (x;y) 2 P(R0). Therefore, (x;y) 2 P(R).
We now distinguish two cases.
Case a. (z;z) 2 R. Analogously to the above proof demonstrating that (x;y) 2
P(R), we obtain (y;z) 2 P(R) in this case. Because R is quasi-transitive, it follows
that (x;z) 2 P(R). Because (x;x) 2 R and (x;z) 2 P(R), we must have (x;z) 2 R0
by deﬁnition of R0. Furthermore, (z;x) 62 R implies (z;x) 62 R0 by deﬁnition of R0 and,
consequently, we obtain (x;z) 2 P(R0).
Case b. (z;z) 62 R. By (5), we obtain (z;x) 62 R0. Suppose (x;z) 62 R0. Because
(x;x) 2 R, this implies (x;z) 62 R by deﬁnition of R0 and hence (z;x) 2 P(R) by the
completeness of R. Because R is quasi-transitive, we obtain (z;y) 2 P(R) and hence
(y;z) 62 R. Because (z;z) 62 R, the deﬁnition of R0 implies (y;z) 62 R0, contradicting
(y;z) 2 P(R0). Therefore, (x;z) 2 R0 and, because (z;x) 62 R0, it follows that (x;z) 2
P(R0).
That R0 greatest-element rationalizes C can be shown using the same proof as in 1.d.
Step 3. To prove that no further implications other than those resulting from Step
2 are valid, it is suﬃcient to provide examples showing that (a) QRC-G does not imply
T-G; (b) QC-G does not imply ARC-G; (c) ARC-G does not imply Q-G; (d) QR-G does
not imply AC-G; and (e) Q-G does not imply QR-G.
3.a. QRC-G does not imply T-G.
Example 3 Let X = fx;y;zg and Σ = X n ffx;y;zgg. Deﬁne the choice function
C by letting C(ftg) = ftg for all t 2 X, C(fx;yg) = fx;yg, C(fx;zg) = fzg, and
C(fy;zg) = fy;zg. This choice function is greatest-element rationalizable by the quasi-
transitive, reﬂexive, and complete relation
R = (X £ X) n f(x;z)g:
Suppose C is greatest-element rationalizable by a transitive relation R0. Because x 2
C(fx;yg), we must have (x;x) 2 R0 and (x;y) 2 R0. Analogously, y 2 C(fy;zg) implies
48(y;z) 2 R0. By the transitivity of R0, it follows that (x;z) 2 R0 and, together with
(x;x) 2 R0, x 2 C(fx;zg), contradicting the deﬁnition of C.
3.b. QC-G does not imply ARC-G.
Example 4 Let X = fx;y;z;wg and Σ = ffx;wg;fy;zg;fy;wg;fx;y;wg;fy;z;wgg,
and deﬁne C(fx;wg) = fwg, C(fy;zg) = fyg, C(fy;wg) = fy;wg, C(fx;y;wg) = fwg,
and C(fy;z;wg) = fyg. This choice function is greatest-element rationalized by the quasi-
transitive and complete relation R given by
f(x;y);(x;z);(x;w);(y;y);(y;z);(y;w);(z;x);(z;y);(z;w);(w;x);(w;y);(w;w)g:
Suppose R0 is acyclical, reﬂexive, and complete and greatest-element rationalizes C.
Because C(fy;zg) = fyg and R0 is reﬂexive, we obtain (y;z) 2 P(R0). Analogously,
because C(fx;wg) = fwg and R0 is reﬂexive, we must have (w;x) 2 P(R0).
Because y 2 C(fy;wg) and y 62 C(fx;y;wg), we must have (y;x) 62 R0 and, because
R0 is complete, it follows that (x;y) 2 P(R0). Analogously, because w 2 C(fy;wg) and
w 62 C(fy;z;wg), we must have (w;z) 62 R0 and, because R0 is complete, it follows that
(z;w) 2 P(R0).
Therefore, we have established that (x;y) 2 P(R0), (y;z) 2 P(R0), (z;w) 2 P(R0),
and (w;x) 2 P(R0), contradicting the acyclicity of R0.
3.c. ARC-G does not imply Q-G.
Example 5 Let X = fx;y;zg and Σ = X n ffx;y;zgg. Deﬁne the choice function
C by letting C(ftg) = ftg for all t 2 X, C(fx;yg) = fxg, C(fx;zg) = fx;zg, and
C(fy;zg) = fyg. This choice function is greatest-element rationalizable by the acyclical,
reﬂexive, and complete relation
R = f(x;x);(x;y);(x;z);(y;y);(y;z);(z;x);(z;z)g:
Suppose C is greatest-element rationalizable by a quasi-transitive relation R0. Because
y 2 C(fy;zg), we have (y;y) 2 R0. Therefore, y 62 C(fx;yg) implies (x;y) 2 P(R0).
Analogously, z 2 C(fx;zg) implies (z;z) 2 R0 and, therefore, z 62 C(fy;zg) implies
(y;z) 2 P(R0). Because R0 is quasi-transitive, it follows that (x;z) 2 P(R0) and hence
(z;x) 62 R0. Because R0 greatest-element rationalizes C, this implies z 62 C(fx;zg),
contradicting the deﬁnition of C.
3.d. QR-G does not imply AC-G.
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function C by letting C(fx;yg) = fx;yg, C(fx;zg) = fx;zg, and C(fx;y;zg) = fxg. C
is greatest-element rationalizable by the quasi-transitive and reﬂexive relation
R = f(x;x);(x;y);(x;z);(y;x);(y;y);(z;x);(z;z)g;
but it cannot be greatest-element rationalized by a complete relation. By way of contra-






Suppose (6) is true. Because R0 greatest-element rationalizes C and y 2 C(fx;yg), it
follows that (y;x) 2 R0 and (y;y) 2 R0. Together with (6) and the greatest-element
rationalizability of C by R0, we obtain y 2 C(fx;y;zg), contradicting the deﬁnition of C.
Now suppose (7) is true. Because R0 greatest-element rationalizes C and z 2 C(fx;zg),
it follows that (z;x) 2 R0 and (z;z) 2 R0. Together with (7) and the greatest-element
rationalizability of C by R0, we obtain z 2 C(fx;y;zg), contradicting the deﬁnition of C.
3.e. Q-G does not imply QR-G.
Example 7 Let X = fx;y;z;wg and Σ = ffx;yg;fy;zg;fz;wg;fx;z;wgg, and deﬁne
the choice function C by letting C(fx;yg) = fyg, C(fy;zg) = fzg, C(fz;wg) = fz;wg,
and C(fx;z;wg) = fwg. This choice function is greatest-element rationalized by the
quasi-transitive relation R given by
f(x;y);(y;x);(y;y);(z;y);(z;z);(z;w);(w;x);(w;z);(w;w)g:
Suppose R0 is quasi-transitive and reﬂexive and greatest-element rationalizes C. By re-
ﬂexivity, (x;x) 2 R0 and, because x 62 C(fx;yg), we must have (y;x) 2 P(R0). Because
y 2 C(fx;yg), it follows that (y;y) 2 R0 and, hence, y 62 C(fy;zg) implies (z;y) 2 P(R0).
By quasi-transitivity, we obtain (z;x) 2 P(R0).
Because z 2 C(fz;wg), it follows that (z;z) 2 R0 and (z;w) 2 R0. Together with
(z;x) 2 P(R0) and the assumption that R0 greatest-element rationalizes C, we obtain
z 2 C(fx;z;wg), which contradicts the deﬁnition of C.
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some surprising diﬀerences between those notions of rationalizability encompassing tran-
sitivity and those that merely require quasi-transitivity or acyclicity. Most strikingly, as
soon as we weaken full transitivity to quasi-transitivity, not even reﬂexivity is implied as
a property of a greatest-element rationalizing relation. On the other hand, all notions
of maximal-element rationalizability coincide if merely quasi-transitivity rather than full
transitivity is required.
The results regarding the logical relationships between our rationalizability axioms
simplify dramatically when base domains are considered. The presence of all one-element
and two-element sets in Σ guarantees that every greatest-element rationalizing relation
must be reﬂexive and complete and, as a consequence, all rationality requirements in-
volving greatest-element rationalizability with a given consistency requirement become
equivalent. All implications of Theorem 1 are preserved and, other than those just men-
tioned, there are no additional ones. Those demanding transitivity are stronger than
those where merely quasi-transitivity is required which, in turn, imply (but are not im-
plied by) all axioms where the rationalizing relation is acyclical. These observations are
summarized in the following theorem.
Theorem 2 Suppose Σ is a base domain. Then
TRC-G, TC-G, TR-G, T-G, TRC-M, TC-M
#
TR-M, T-M, QRC-G, QC-G, QR-G, Q-G, QRC-M, QC-M, QR-M, Q-M
#
ARC-G, AC-G, AR-G, A-G, ARC-M, AC-M, AR-M, A-M
The implications and equivalences of the theorem follow immediately from Theorem 1
and the assumption that Σ is a base domain. Furthermore, Examples 3 and 5 can be
employed to demonstrate that the implications between boxes are strict. Thus, no formal
proof is required.
As shown in Theorem 2, there are only three diﬀerent versions of rationalizability for
base domains. As a consequence, we can restrict attention to the rationalizability axioms
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rationalizability requirements discussed in this chapter are covered as well by our results.
Note that, in the case of transitive greatest-element rationalizability, all deﬁnitions
of rationalizability are equivalent even if Σ only contains all two-element sets but not
necessarily the singletons; this is a consequence of the observation that if R is a transitive
(and complete) relation greatest-element rationalizing C, it is always possible to ﬁnd a
reﬂexive and transitive (and complete) relation that contains R and rationalizes C as
well; see Richter [9; 10]. Therefore, the equivalence of all axioms involving a transitive
greatest-element rationalization can be established for binary domains as well. We do
not state the corresponding result formally as a separate theorem because our focus is on
quasi-transitive and acyclical rationalizability in this chapter.
4 Characterizations for Binary and Base Domains
If we restrict attention to base domains (that is, domains Σ that contain all one-element
and two-element sets), the analysis of quasi-transitive and acyclical rationalizability is
signiﬁcantly less complex than in the case of an arbitrary domain, and we obtain “clean”
characterization results. In addition, we formulate a new characterization result regarding
transitive rationalizability for binary domains. The full power of a base domain is not
required in the transitive case because reﬂexivity can always be added as a property of a
rationalizing relation as long as transitivity is satisﬁed.
Note that the assumption of having a base domain diﬀers in an important aspect from
the assumption used by Sen [16], which stipulates that not only the sets of cardinality two,
but also those of cardinality three are in Σ. (Sen did not require the singletons to be in
the domain due to the observation that, for transitive greatest-element rationalizability,
reﬂexivity can always be added as a property of a greatest-element rationalizing relation
— see the discussion at the end of the previous section.) It is interesting to note that, in
order to obtain useful and applicable results for quasi-transitive and acyclical rationalizing
relations, those sets of cardinality three are not required in the domain, even though
these consistency properties impose restrictions on three or more alternatives which may
be distinct. It is not suﬃcient to assume that we have a binary domain (that is, a
domain containing all two-element sets). The singleton sets are needed if transitivity is
weakened to quasi-transitivity or acyclicity because, without full transitivity, reﬂexivity
of a rationalizing relation can no longer be guaranteed. Base domains have also been used
by Herzberger [5] but he did not pursue the same questions we address in this chapter.
524.1 Transitive Rationalizability
In the case of binary domains, we obtain a new characterization of TRC-G that employs a
weaker axiom than Richter’s [9] congruence axiom to be deﬁned in Section 5. This axiom
— which we call T-congruence — is deﬁned as follows.
T-Congruence: For all x;y;z 2 X, for all S 2 Σ, if (x;y) 2 RC, (y;z) 2 RC, x 2 S and
z 2 C(S), then x 2 C(S).
Note that, in contrast to congruence, T-congruence does not apply to chains of direct
revealed preference of an arbitrary length but merely to chains involving three elements.
For binary domains, T-congruence is necessary and suﬃcient for TRC-G. Of course, T-
congruence is necessary for greatest-element rationalizability by a transitive relation on
an arbitrary domain but it is not suﬃcient unless speciﬁc domain assumptions are made.
Example 8 Let X = fx;y;z;wg, Σ = ffx;yg;fy;zg;fz;wg;fx;wgg, and deﬁne C by
C(fx;yg) = fxg, C(fy;zg) = fyg), C(fz;wg) = fzg, and C(fx;wg) = fwg. This choice
function satisﬁes T-congruence but it is not greatest-element rationalizable by a transitive
relation. To see this, suppose R is transitive and greatest-element rationalizes C. The
deﬁnition of C yields (x;y) 2 RC, (y;z) 2 RC, (z;w) 2 RC, and (x;x) 2 RC. By Lemma
1, (x;y) 2 R, (y;z) 2 R, (z;w) 2 R, and (x;x) 2 R. Because R is transitive, we
must have (x;w) 2 R. By deﬁnition of greatest-element rationalizability, it follows that
x 2 C(fx;wg), a contradiction.
It is an interesting observation that binary domains are suﬃcient to obtain results of
that nature involving transitivity, even though those domains do not necessarily contain
all triples. This is in contrast to Sen’s [16] results which crucially depend on having all
triples available in the domain. We obtain
Theorem 3 Suppose Σ is a binary domain. C satisﬁes TRC-G if and only if C satisﬁes
T-congruence.
Proof. Let Σ be a binary domain. This implies that RC is complete—see the proof of
Theorem 2.
Step 1. That TRC-G implies T-congruence follows immediately from Richter’s [9]
result and the observation that T-congruence is weaker than his congruence axiom.
Step 2. We show that T-congruence implies TRC-G. Let
R = RC [ f(x;x) j x 2 Xg:
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prove that R is transitive. Suppose (x;y) 2 R and (y;z) 2 R for some x;y;z 2 X. If
x = z, (x;z) 2 R follows from the reﬂexivity of R. If x 6= z, it follows that fx;zg 2 Σ
because Σ is a binary domain. By T-congruence, x 2 C(fx;zg) and hence (x;z) 2 RC
which, by Lemma 1, implies (x;z) 2 R.
Finally, we show that R greatest-element rationalizes C. Let S 2 Σ and x 2 S.
Suppose x 2 C(S). This implies (x;y) 2 RC for all y 2 S and hence (x;y) 2 R for all
y 2 S. Hence, x 2 G(S;R).
Now suppose x 2 G(S;R), that is, (x;y) 2 R for all y 2 S. If S = fxg, we have
C(S) = fxg because C(S) is non-empty and hence (x;x) 2 RC. If there exists y 2 S
such that y 6= x, it follows that (x;y) 2 RC and, by deﬁnition of RC, x must be chosen
for some feasible set in Σ. Thus, again, (x;x) 2 RC. Therefore, (x;y) 2 RC for all y 2 S.
Let z 2 C(S). This implies (z;z) 2 RC. Because z 2 S, (x;z) 2 RC. Letting y = z in
the deﬁnition of T-congruence, the axiom implies x 2 C(S).
Clearly, if Σ is a base domain rather than merely a binary domain, RC is reﬂexive and
can be used as the rationalizing relation in the above theorem. A corollary of Theorem 3
is that, on a base domain, T-congruence and congruence are equivalent. In general, this
need not be the case: congruence always implies T-congruence but the reverse implication
is not true on all domains.
4.2 Quasi-Transitive Rationalizability
To obtain a set of necessary and suﬃcient conditions for QRC-G in the case of a base
domain, we add the following Q-congruence axiom to the D-congruence axiom introduced
in Section 2.
Q-Congruence: For all x;y;z 2 X, for all S 2 Σ, if (x;y) 2 P(RC), (y;z) 2 P(RC) and
x 2 S, then z 62 C(S).
Together with D-congruence, Q-congruence guarantees that the direct revealed preference
relation RC is quasi-transitive. Note, again, that we do not need to impose a restriction
regarding chains of (strict) revealed preferences of arbitrary length. We obtain
Theorem 4 Suppose Σ is a base domain. C satisﬁes QRC-G if and only if C satisﬁes
D-congruence and Q-congruence.
Proof. Let Σ be a base domain. Therefore, RC is reﬂexive and complete — see the proof
of Theorem 2.
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implied follows from Lemma 3). Suppose R is a quasi-transitive relation that greatest-
element rationalizes C. Let x;y;z 2 X and S 2 Σ be such that (x;y) 2 P(RC), (y;z) 2
P(RC), and x 2 S. By Lemma 2, (x;y) 2 P(R) and (y;z) 2 P(R) and, because R is
quasi-transitive, (x;z) 2 P(R). This implies (z;x) 62 R and because R greatest-element
rationalizes C, we have z 62 C(S).
Step 2. We show that D-congruence and Q-congruence together imply QRC-G. First,
we prove that RC is quasi-transitive. Suppose (x;y) 2 P(RC) and (y;z) 2 P(RC) for some
x;y;z 2 X. Because Σ is a base domain, fx;zg 2 Σ. By Q-congruence, z 62 C(fx;zg)
and hence x 2 C(fx;zg) which implies (x;z) 2 RC. Since RC is reﬂexive, (z;z) 2 RC.
If (z;x) 2 RC, D-congruence implies z 2 C(fx;zg), a contradiction. Therefore, (x;z) 2
P(RC).
The rest of the proof proceeds as in Richter [10] by showing that RC greatest-element
rationalizes C, given D-congruence. Let S 2 Σ and x 2 S. Suppose x 2 C(S). This
implies (x;y) 2 RC for all y 2 S and hence x 2 G(S;RC). Now suppose x 2 G(S;RC),
that is, (x;y) 2 RC for all y 2 S. By D-congruence, x 2 C(S).
D-congruence and Q-congruence are independent on base domains, as shown by means
of the following examples.
Example 9 Let X = fx;y;zg and Σ = X n ffx;y;zgg, and deﬁne C(ftg) = ftg for all
t 2 X, C(fx;yg) = fxg, C(fy;zg) = fyg, and C(fx;zg) = fzg. This choice function
satisﬁes D-congruence but violates Q-congruence.
Example 10 Let X = fx;y;zg and Σ = X, and deﬁne C(ftg) = ftg for all t 2 X,
C(fx;yg) = fx;yg, C(fy;zg) = fy;zg, C(fx;zg) = fx;zg, and C(fx;y;zg) = fy;zg.
This choice function satisﬁes Q-congruence but violates D-congruence.
Q-congruence is a weaker axiom than the quasi-transitivity of RC; it is only in con-
junction with D-congruence that it implies that the revealed preference relation is quasi-
transitive. Strengthening Q-congruence to the quasi-transitivity of RC does not allow us
to drop D-congruence in the above characterization. Note that the above example show-
ing that Q-congruence does not imply D-congruence is such that RC is quasi-transitive,
and recall that D-congruence is necessary for greatest-element rationalizability on any
domain (Lemma 3).
Given that we employ a base domain, it is natural to ask whether the base relation
BC could be used in place of the revealed preference relation RC in the formulation of
D-congruence and Q-congruence. This is not the case.
55Example 11 Let X = fx;y;xg and Σ = X, and deﬁne C(ftg) = ftg for all t 2 X,
C(fx;yg) = fyg, C(fx;zg) = fzg, C(fy;zg) = fy;zg, and C(fx;y;zg) = fx;y;zg. This
choice function satisﬁes the modiﬁcations of D-congruence and Q-congruence where RC
is replaced with BC but it does not satisfy D-congruence (and, thus, fails to be greatest-
element rationalizable by any binary relation). Note that replacing RC with BC leads to
a weakening of D-congruence but to a strengthening of Q-congruence.
4.3 Acyclical Rationalizability
If quasi-transitivity is weakened to acyclicity, it seems natural to replace Q-congruence by
the following A-congruence axiom in order to obtain a characterization of the respective
rationalizability property on a base domain.
A-Congruence: For all x;y 2 X, for all S 2 Σ, if (x;y) 2 P(RC), x 2 S and y 2 C(S),
then x 2 C(S).
It is indeed the case that D-congruence and A-congruence together are necessary and
suﬃcient for ARC-G on base domains. However, A-congruence by itself is stronger than
the acyclicity of RC and, thus, a stronger characterization result can be obtained by
employing acyclicity instead of A-congruence.
Theorem 5 Suppose Σ is a base domain. C satisﬁes ARC-G if and only if C satisﬁes
D-congruence and RC is acyclical.
Proof. Let Σ be a base domain. Again, it follows that RC is reﬂexive and complete.
Step 1. We ﬁrst show that ARC-G implies that RC is acyclical (again, that D-
congruence is implied follows from Lemma 3).
Suppose R is an acyclical, reﬂexive, and complete relation that greatest-element ra-
tionalizes C. Let K 2 N n f1g and x0;:::;xK 2 X be such that (xk¡1;xk) 2 P(RC) for
all k 2 f1;:::;Kg. By Lemma 2, (xk¡1;xk) 2 P(R) for all k 2 f1;:::;Kg. Because R is
acyclical, we have (xK;x0) 62 P(R) and, since R is reﬂexive and complete, (x0;xK) 2 R.
Because R is reﬂexive, (xK;xK) 2 R. Because Σ is a base domain, fx0;xKg 2 Σ. Because
R greatest-element rationalizes C, x0 2 C(fx0;xKg) and hence (x0;xK) 2 RC, which
implies (xK;x0) 62 P(RC).
Step 2. D-congruence and the acyclicity of RC together imply ARC-G because D-
congruence implies that RC greatest-element rationalizes C, as was shown in the last
paragraph of the proof of Theorem 4.
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and 10. Analogously, D-congruence cannot be replaced with an axiom that merely applies
to the base relation BC instead of RC.
5 Conditions for Arbitrary Domains
In this section, we examine greatest-element rationalizability and maximal-element ra-
tionalizability on completely arbitrary domains under various assumptions regarding the
properties of a rationalizing relation. Because Richter’s [9] and Suzumura’s [20; 21, p. 48]
results characterizing TRC-G for arbitrary domains are well-known, we only discuss the
quasi-transitive and asymmetric cases.
5.1 Quasi-Transitive Rationalizability
If we move from a base domain to an arbitrary domain, the conjunction of Q-congruence
and D-congruence ceases to be suﬃcient for QRC-G, as can be seen from Example 4.
Moreover, Q-congruence is not a necessary condition for QRC-G either, as demonstrated
by the following example.
Example 12 Let X = fx;y;z;u;v;wg, Σ = ffx;y;ug;fx;z;wg;fy;z;vgg, and deﬁne
C(fx;y;ug) = fx;ug, C(fx;z;wg) = fz;wg, and C(fy;z;vg) = fy;vg. This choice
function is greatest-element rationalizable by the quasi-transitive, reﬂexive, and complete
relation R given by
f(x;t) j t 2 X n fwgg [ f(y;t) j t 2 X n fugg [ f(z;t) j t 2 X n fvgg
[ f(u;t) j t 2 Xg [ f(v;t) j t 2 Xg [ f(w;t) j t 2 Xg:
Since (x;y) 2 P(RC) and (y;z) 2 P(RC), Q-congruence requires z 62 C(fx;z;wg), con-
tradicting the deﬁnition of C.
The formulation of necessary and suﬃcient conditions for greatest-element or maximal-
element rationalizability by a quasi-transitive relation is a complex task. Suzumura [21, p.
50] shows that the strong axiom of revealed preference is a suﬃcient (but not a necessary)
condition for QRC-G. Now we present a condition that is necessary (but not suﬃcient,
even if combined with D-congruence) for QRC-G.
The axiom we employ involves a recursive construction. The idea is to identify circum-
stances that force a strict preference between two elements of X and impose a condition
57ensuring that this forced strict preference is transitive, as required by the quasi-transitivity
of a rationalizing relation.
Suppose C is greatest-element rationalizable by a quasi-transitive, reﬂexive, and com-
plete relation R. Consider a feasible set S 2 Σ and distinct elements x;y 2 S such that
y is not chosen in S but y is directly revealed preferred to all z 2 S n fx;yg. By Lemma
1, (y;z) 2 R for all z 2 S n fx;yg and, together with the reﬂexivity and completeness of
R, y 2 S n C(S) requires that x be declared strictly preferred to y according to R and,
by quasi-transitivity, all chains of strict preference thus established must be respected as
well. Moreover, once it is implied that x is declared strictly preferred to y according to
the above argument (or, more generally, according to the transitive closure of the rela-
tion thus obtained), this strict preference may have further implications: there may exist
another set T 2 Σ such that x;y 2 T, x is declared preferred to all z 2 T n fx;y;wg for
some w 2 S n fx;yg, and x is not chosen in T. In that case, we must declare a strict
preference for w over x according to R. This procedure can be repeated recursively, and
we now present a formal deﬁnition of this recursion, followed by a necessary condition
for QRC-G based on this recursive construction. This recursion is analogous to the one
employed in Bossert [3].
Deﬁne the relation F 0
C on X as follows. For all x;y 2 X, (x;y) 2 F 0
C if there exists
S 2 Σ such that x 2 S n fyg, y 2 S n C(S), and (y;z) 2 RC for all z 2 S n fx;yg.
Now let i 2 N. Let J
i¡1
C = RC [F
i¡1
C , and deﬁne the relation F i
C on X as follows. For




C ] or [there exists S 2 Σ such that x 2 S n fyg;y 2 S n C(S);
and (y;z) 2 J
i¡1
C for all z 2 S n fx;yg]:
Finally, let J1
C = [i2N0Ji
C and F 1
C = [i2N0F i
C. The following axiom turns out to be
necessary for QRC-G.
Recursive Q-Congruence: For all x;y 2 X, if (x;y) 2 F 1
C , then (y;x) 62 J1
C .
We obtain
Theorem 6 If C satisﬁes QRC-G, then C satisﬁes recursive Q-congruence. The converse
implication is not true.
Proof. Suppose R is a quasi-transitive, reﬂexive, and complete relation that greatest-
element rationalizes C. We ﬁrst prove that
F
1
C µ P(R): (8)
58Clearly, by deﬁnition of F 1
C , it is suﬃcient to prove that F i
C µ P(R) for all i 2 N0. We
proceed by induction.
Step 1. i = 0. We ﬁrst show that F 0
C µ P(R). Suppose (x;y) 2 F 0
C for some x;y 2 X.
By deﬁnition, there exists S 2 Σ such that (y;z) 2 RC for all z 2 S nfx;yg, x 2 S nfyg,
and y 2 S n C(S). By Lemma 1, (y;z) 2 R for all z 2 S n fx;yg and, because R is
reﬂexive, (y;y) 2 R. Because y 2 S n C(S) and R greatest-element rationalizes C, we
must have (y;x) 62 R. Hence, because R is complete, (x;y) 2 P(R).
Because R is quasi-transitive (that is, P(R) is transitive) and F 0
C is the transitive
closure of F 0
C, it follows that F 0
C µ P(R).
Step 2. Let i 2 N and suppose F
j
C µ P(R) for all j 2 f0;:::;i ¡ 1g. Let (x;y) 2 F i
C
for some x;y 2 X. By deﬁnition, there are two cases.
2.a. (x;y) 2 F
i¡1
C . In this case, (x;y) 2 P(R) follows from the induction hypothesis.
2.b. There exists S 2 Σ such that (y;z) 2 J
i¡1
C for all z 2 S n fx;yg, x 2 S n fyg,
and y 2 S n C(S). Let z 2 S n fx;yg. By deﬁnition of J
i¡1
C we have (y;z) 2 RC or
(y;z) 2 F
i¡1
C . If (y;z) 2 RC, Lemma 1 implies (y;z) 2 R. If (y;z) 2 F
i¡1
C , (y;z) 2 R
follows from the induction hypothesis. Therefore, (y;z) 2 R for all z 2 S n fx;yg and,
using the same argument as in Step 1, we obtain F i
C µ P(R) and, by the quasi-transitivity
of R, F i
C µ P(R). This completes the proof of (8).
Next, we prove that
J
1
C µ R: (9)
Again, it is suﬃcient to prove that Ji
C µ R for all i 2 N0. Let (x;y) 2 Ji
C for some
x;y 2 X. By deﬁnition, (x;y) 2 RC or (x;y) 2 F i
C. If (x;y) 2 RC, (x;y) 2 R follows
from Lemma 1. If (x;y) 2 F i
C, (x;y) 2 R follows from the proof of (8). Therefore, (9) is
true.
To complete the proof that QRC-G implies recursive Q-congruence, we proceed by
contradiction. Suppose recursive Q-congruence is violated. Then there exists x;y 2 X
such that (x;y) 2 F 1
C and (y;x) 2 J1
C . By (8) and (9), we have (x;y) 2 P(R) and
(y;x) 2 R, a contradiction.
To see that the converse implication is not true, consider the following example.
Example 13 Let X = fx;y;z;u;v;wg and Σ = ffx;y;ug;fy;z;vg;fx;z;wgg and deﬁne
C by letting C(fx;y;ug) = fxg, C(fy;z;vg) = fyg, and C(fx;z;wg) = fzg. It is
straightforward to check that F 0
C = ;. It follows that J0
C = RC, Ji
C = J0
C = RC for all
i 2 N, and F 1
C = F i
C = F 0
C = ; for all i 2 N. Thus, recursive Q-congruence is trivially
satisﬁed. Because we will use this example in the following subsection as well, we show that
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(and, thus, it cannot be greatest-element rationalized by a quasi-transitive, reﬂexive, and
complete relation). Suppose, by way of contradiction, that R is acyclical, reﬂexive, and
complete and greatest-element rationalizes C. Because y;u 2 fx;y;ug n C(fx;y;ug) and
R is reﬂexive and complete, we must have
1.a. (x;y) 2 P(R) or 1.b. [(x;u) 2 P(R) and (u;y) 2 P(R)]:
Analogously, because z;v 2 fy;z;vg n C(fy;z;vg) and x;w 2 fx;z;wg n C(fx;z;wg), we
have
2.a. (y;z) 2 P(R) or 2.b. [(y;v) 2 P(R) and (v;z) 2 P(R)]
and
3.a. (z;x) 2 P(R) or 3.b. [(z;w) 2 P(R) and (w;x) 2 P(R)]:
If 1.a, 2.a, and 3.a are true, we immediately obtain a contradiction to the acyclicity
of R.
If 1.a, 2.a, and 3.b are true, we have (x;y) 2 P(R), (y;z) 2 P(R), (z;w) 2 P(R), and
(w;x) 2 P(R), contradicting the acyclicity of R. Because of the symmetric role played by
x;y, and z, analogous contradictions are obtained whenever statements i.a, j.a, and k.b
are true for any distinct values of i;j;k 2 f1;2;3g.
If 1.a, 2.b, and 3.b are true, we obtain (x;y) 2 P(R), (y;v) 2 P(R), (v;z) 2 P(R),
(z;w) 2 P(R), and (w;x) 2 P(R), again a violation of acyclicity. Using the symmetric
role of x;y, and z again, analogous contradictions are obtained whenever statements i.a,
j.b, and k.b are true for any distinct values of i;j;k 2 f1;2;3g.
Finally, if 1.b, 2.b, and 2.c are true, we obtain (x;u) 2 P(R), (u;y) 2 P(R), (y;v) 2
P(R), (v;z) 2 P(R), (z;w) 2 P(R), and (w;x) 2 P(R), and acyclicity is violated again.
We noted in Lemma 3 that D-congruence is a necessary condition for greatest-element
rationalizability by any relation. This raises the question whether recursive Q-congruence
implies D-congruence. To see that this is indeed the case, suppose D-congruence is vio-
lated. Then there exist S 2 Σ and x 2 S such that (x;y) 2 RC for all y 2 S and x 62 C(S).
By deﬁnition, this implies (y;x) 2 F 0
C µ F 1
C for all y 2 S n fxg. Because C(S) µ S is
non-empty and x 2 S n C(S), S n fxg is non-empty. Consider any y 2 S n fxg. Because
(x;y) 2 RC we have (x;y) 2 J1
C . Therefore, we obtain (y;x) 2 F 1
C and (x;y) 2 J1
C ,
contradicting recursive Q-congruence.
60Furthermore, recursive Q-congruence and Q-congruence are independent. The choice
function in Example 12 satisﬁes recursive Q-congruence (by Theorem 6; note that it
satisﬁes QRC-G) but violates Q-congruence. Conversely, the choice function in Example
4 satisﬁes Q-congruence but violates recursive Q-congruence. To see this, note ﬁrst that
RC = f(y;y);(y;z);(y;w);(w;x);(w;y);(w;w)g. In view of the deﬁnition of C, it follows
that F 0
C = f(x;y);(y;z);(z;w);(w;x)g, and the transitive closure of F 0
C is therefore given
by F 0
C = X £ X. It follows that F 1
C = J1
C = X £ X, a contradiction to recursive
Q-congruence.
Because no particular assumptions are formulated regarding the domain of the choice
function, it seems that conditions that are both necessary and suﬃcient cannot be formu-
lated without invoking existential clauses. Moreover, contrary to the transitive case,
quasi-transitivity of a greatest-element rationalizing relation does not imply that the
asymmetric factor of the revealed preference relation must be contained in this ratio-
nalizing relation—see the discussion regarding Lemma 2 in Section 2. These observations
appear to be an important part of the reason why there does not exist much literature
on the subject of quasi-transitive rational choice on arbitrary domains. Rather than con-
structing the relation F 1
C one pair of alternatives at a time, a tighter necessary condition
would be to establish the existence of an alternative x 2 S such that x can be declared
better than y if y is feasible but not chosen in S. This kind of condition involves an
existential clause, and conditions of that nature are diﬃcult to verify in practice and,
therefore, are of limited interest.
5.2 Acyclical Rationalizability
A-congruence (and, thus, the acyclicity of RC) fails to be suﬃcient for ARC-G even
in the presence of D-congruence, as Example 4 shows. Moreover, the acyclicity of RC
(and, thus, A-congruence) is not necessary for ARC-G in the case of a general domain.
This is established by Example 12; note that, in Example 12, we have (x;y) 2 P(RC),
(y;z) 2 P(RC), and (z;x) 2 P(RC).
As is the case for quasi-transitivity, the formulation of necessary and suﬃcient con-
ditions for acyclical rationalizability appears to necessitate the use of axioms involving
existential clauses. We provide a discussion analogous to the one for quasi-transitivity to
illustrate the issues involved. First, we present a new suﬃcient condition for ARC-G. To
do so, we employ the relation EC introduced in Suzumura [19]. It is deﬁned as follows.
For all x;y 2 X, (x;y) 2 EC if there exists S 2 Σ such that x 2 C(S) and y 2 S n C(S).
61Strong A-Congruence: For all x;y 2 X, for all S 2 Σ, if (x;y) 2 EC [ RC, x 2 S and
y 2 C(S), then x 2 C(S).
We obtain
Theorem 7 If C satisﬁes strong A-congruence, then C satisﬁes ARC-G. The converse
implication is not true.
Proof. Suppose C satisﬁes strong A-congruence. First, we prove that EC is asymmetric.
Suppose, by way of contradiction, that there exist x;y 2 X such that (x;y) 2 EC and
(y;x) 2 EC. Therefore, there exist K;K0 2 N, x0;:::;xK 2 X, and z0;:::;zK0 2 X
such that x0 = zK0 = x, xK = z0 = y, (xk¡1;xk) 2 EC for all k 2 f1;:::;Kg, and
(zk¡1;zk) 2 EC for all k 2 f1;:::;K0g. Hence, (x;zK0¡1) 2 EC and (zK0¡1;x) 2 EC.
By deﬁnition of EC, there exists S 2 Σ such that zK0¡1 2 C(S) and x 2 S n C(S),
contradicting strong A-congruence.
Now deﬁne
R = f(x;y) 2 X £ X j (y;x) 62 ECg [ RC:
Clearly, R is reﬂexive and complete by the asymmetry of EC. To prove that R is acyclical,
we ﬁrst derive the asymmetric factor of R. By deﬁnition, (x;y) 2 P(R) if
[(y;x) 62 EC or (x;y) 2 RC] and [(x;y) 2 EC and (y;x) 62 RC]
which is equivalent to
[(y;x) 62 EC and (x;y) 2 EC and (y;x) 62 RC] or
[(x;y) 2 RC and (x;y) 2 EC and (y;x) 62 RC]:
Using the asymmetry of EC, this is equivalent to
[(x;y) 2 EC and (y;x) 62 RC] or [(x;y) 2 EC and (x;y) 2 P(RC)]
or, equivalently,
[(x;y) 2 EC and (y;x) 62 RC]: (10)
Now we establish the acyclicity of R. Suppose there exist K 2 Nnf1g and x0;:::;xK 2
X such that x0 = x, xK = y, (xk¡1;xk) 2 EC and (xk;xk¡1) 62 RC for all k 2 f1;:::;Kg.
Because EC is transitive, we have (x;y) 2 EC and, by the asymmetry of EC, (y;x) 62 EC.
By (10), this implies (y;x) 62 P(R).
Finally, we show that R greatest-element rationalizes C. Let S 2 Σ and x 2 S.
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(x;y) 2 R for all y 2 S, and we have x 2 G(S;R).
Now suppose x 2 G(S;R). This implies
[(y;x) 62 EC or (x;y) 2 RC] for all y 2 S: (11)
Let z 2 C(S) µ S. This implies (z;x) 2 RC. Because z 2 S, (11) implies
(z;x) 62 EC (12)
or
(x;z) 2 RC: (13)
If (12) is true, we must have x 2 C(S) because otherwise (z;x) 2 EC by deﬁnition
and hence (z;x) 2 EC.
If (13) is true, x 2 C(S) follows from strong A-congruence.
To show that strong A-congruence is not implied by ARC-G, note that Example 12 can
be employed here as well: QRC-G (and, thus, ARC-G) is satisﬁed but we have (x;z) 2 EC
and z 2 C(fx;z;wg) and x 2 fx;z;wgnC(fx;z;wg), contradicting strong A-congruence.
Strong A-congruence is a tighter suﬃcient condition for ARC-G than the set of suﬃ-
cient conditions established in Suzumura [21, p. 51]. The conditions used in this earlier
contribution are the following.
Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference: For all x;y 2 X, for all S 2 Σ, if (x;y) 2 EC
and x 2 S, then y 62 C(S).
No EC-Cycles: For all x;y 2 X, for all S 2 Σ, if (x;y) 2 EC, x 2 S and y 2 C(S), then
x 2 C(S).
We obtain
Theorem 8 If C satisﬁes the weak axiom of revealed preference and no EC-cycles, then
C satisﬁes strong A-congruence. The converse implication is not true.
Proof. Suppose strong A-congruence is violated. Then there exist x;y 2 X such that
(x;y) 2 EC [ RC and (y;x) 2 EC. If the weak axiom of revealed preference is satisﬁed,
it follows that (x;y) 62 RC. Therefore, we must have (x;y) 2 EC, and we obtain an
EC-cycle.
To see that the converse implication is not true, consider the following example.
63Example 14 Let X = fx;y;zg and Σ = ffx;yg;fx;y;zgg and deﬁne C by letting
C(fx;yg) = fx;yg and C(fx;y;zg) = fxg. It is straightforward to verify that C sat-
isﬁes strong A-congruence but violates the weak axiom of revealed preference.
To obtain a necessary condition for ARC-G, we employ a recursive construction as in
the previous subsection. Let H0
C = F 0
C and, for i 2 N, let L
i¡1








C ] or [there exists S 2 Σ such that x 2 S n fyg;y 2 S n C(S);
and (y;z) 2 L
i¡1






Analogously to recursive Q-congruence, the following condition is necessary for ARC-
G.
Recursive A-Congruence: For all x;y 2 X, if (x;y) 2 H1
C , then (y;x) 62 L1
C .
We now obtain
Theorem 9 If C satisﬁes ARC-G, then C satisﬁes recursive A-congruence. The converse
implication is not true.
Proof. Suppose R is an acyclical, reﬂexive, and complete relation that greatest-element
rationalizes C. To demonstrate that A-congruence is implied, we ﬁrst prove
H
1
C µ P(R): (14)
Again, by deﬁnition of H1
C , it is suﬃcient to prove that Hi
C µ P(R) for all i 2 N0. We
proceed by induction.
Step 1. i = 0. Because H0
C = F 0
C, Step 1 of the proof of Theorem 6 can be employed
to conclude that H0
C µ P(R).
Step 2. Let i 2 N and suppose H
j
C µ P(R) for all j 2 f0;:::;i¡1g. Let (x;y) 2 Hi
C
for some x;y 2 X. By deﬁnition, there are two cases.
2.a. (x;y) 2 H
i¡1
C . In this case, (x;y) 2 P(R) follows from the induction hypothesis.
2.b. There exists S 2 Σ such that (y;z) 2 L
i¡1
C for all z 2 S n fx;yg, x 2 S n fyg,
and y 2 S n C(S). Let z 2 S n fx;yg. By deﬁnition of L
i¡1
C we have (y;z) 2 RC or
(y;z) 2 H
i¡1
C . If (y;z) 2 RC, Lemma 1 implies (y;z) 2 R. If (y;z) 2 H
i¡1
C , there exist
K 2 N and x0;:::;xK 2 X such that x0 = y, xK = z and (xk¡1;xk) 2 H
i¡1
C for all
64k 2 f1;:::;Kg. By the induction hypothesis, (xk¡1;xk) 2 P(R) for all k 2 f1;:::;Kg,
and the acyclicity and the completeness of R together imply (y;z) 2 R. Therefore,
(y;z) 2 R for all z 2 S nfx;yg and, using the same argument as in Step 1 of the proof of
Theorem 6, we obtain Hi




C µ R; (15)
the proof of this claim is analogous to the proof of (9).
To complete the proof that recursive A-congruence is satisﬁed, the same argument as
in the proof of Theorem 6 can be employed, where F 1
C and J1
C are replaced with H1
C
and L1
C , and (8) and (9) are replaced with (14) and (15).
To see that the converse implication is not true, note that the choice function in
Example 13 satisﬁes recursive A-congruence (trivially because H1
C = ;) but it cannot be
greatest-element rationalized by an acyclical relation.
Recursive A-congruence implies D-congruence; the proof is analogous to the proof
establishing that recursive Q-congruence implies D-congruence.
Furthermore, recursive A-congruence does not imply the acyclicity of RC (and, thus,
fails to imply A-congruence). This is shown by Example 13. Conversely, recursive A-
congruence is not implied by A-congruence (and, thus, it is not implied by the acyclicity
of RC; Example 4 establishes this claim.
6 Concluding Remarks
We conclude this chapter with a brief discussion of some open problems. As mentioned
in the text, it seems very diﬃcult to obtain useful necessary and suﬃcient conditions for
QRC-G or for ARC-G on general domains. Given that very indirect implications of prefer-
ence maximization have to be taken into consideration, the nature of the problem suggests
that existential clauses have to be invoked in order to arrive at full characterizations. See
also Bossert [3] for analogous diﬃculties in a diﬀerent framework.
If the formulation of clean necessary and suﬃcient conditions for QRC-G and for
ARC-G turns out to be too complex a task, the following more modest objective might
be an issue to be addressed in future work. Note that the strong axiom of revealed
preference, a suﬃcient condition for QRC-G, is not implied by TRC-G and, analogously,
strong A-congruence is not implied by QRC-G. Likewise, recursive Q-congruence does
not imply ARC-G. One direction in which the results of this chapter could be extended is
65to ﬁnd a condition that is intermediate in strength between TRC-G and QRC-G, and a
condition that is implied by QRC-G and implies ARC-G in order to obtain tighter bounds
on possible characterizations.
We conclude by remarking that the strong axiom of revealed preference cannot be
weakened to strong A-congruence to get a tighter suﬃcient condition for QRC-G (this
is established by Example 5). Similarly, recursive A-congruence cannot be strengthened
to recursive Q-congruence to get a tighter necessary condition for ARC-G (again, this is
established by Example 5).
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